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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of cash versus in-kind transfers on child labor. Using data from 
a program which randomly transferred either cash or a basket of food to poor households in 
Mexico, I fi nd that the cash transfer reduced children’s work participation by a signifi cantly 
larger margin than the in-kind transfer. Both transfers had large negative effects on child labor 
among recipients in the middle tertile of the income distribution. However, the in-kind transfer 
did not reduce child labor among children in the bottom tertile, whereas the cash transfer did. 
Moreover, transfer recipients in different income tertiles adjust child labor on different margins 
(extensive versus intensive). I show that the different margins of adjustment across the income 
distribution can be rationalized by a model in which preferences for schooling respect a luxury 
axiom and the household could forego child labor earnings only when the transfer pushes 
consumption above subsistence.
Keywords: cash transfers, in-kind transfers, child labor, schooling.
JEL classifi cation: D61, H23, H43, I38, O12.
Resumen
Este documento estudia los efectos de transferencias en efectivo y en especie en el trabajo 
infantil y en la asistencia escolar de niños en municipios rurales de México. Utilizando 
datos de un programa de asistencia a hogares pobres que transfi rió de manera aleatoria 
una transferencia en efectivo o una cesta de comida, se muestra que ambas transferencias 
reducen el trabajo infantil, aunque el efecto de la transferencia en efectivo es más elevado 
que el de la transferencia en especie. Al ser la transferencia en especie regresiva, no resulta 
efectiva para reducir el trabajo infantil entre hogares en la parte más baja de la distribución 
de la renta. Además, benefi ciarios en diferentes cuantiles de la distribución de la renta 
reducen el trabajo infantil en distintos márgenes (extensivo frente a intensivo). El efecto 
heterogéneo del programa a lo largo de la distribución de la renta es coherente con 
un modelo en el que la educación es un bien de lujo y el hogar renuncia a la renta originada 
por el trabajo infantil solo cuando la renta familiar se sitúa por encima de cierto nivel 
de subsistencia.
Palabras clave: transferencias en especie, transferencias en efectivo, trabajo infantil, 
educación.
Códigos JEL: D61, H23, H43, I38, O12.
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1Basu and Van (1998) develop a model in which child labor arises as a result of multiple equilibria: one in which
children work because parental earnings in the labor market are low; and another in which children do not work
because parental wages are high. Baland and Robinson (2000) show that child labor is inefficiently high when capital
markets are imperfect since parents use child labor as a substitute for their inability to borrow against their children’s
future earnings. Similarly, Ranjan (2001) develops a model in which child labor arises due to credit constraints.
2Apart from the literature on poverty alleviation programs, which is reviewed in the main text, the relationship
between changes in economic conditions and the time allocation of children has been studied empirically in an exten-
sive number of settings, with mixed results. Edmonds (2005) finds that the reduction of child labor in Vietnam can be
mainly explained by sustained economic growth. Schady (2004) documents that children exposed to macroeconomic
crises in Peru are less likely to work. Kruger (2007) presents evidence that children in coffee producing regions in
Brazil work more during economic booms. Soares et al. (2012) suggest that the contradictory results in the literature
can be explained by different types of income shocks having income and substitution effects on child labor.
1 Introduction
Child labor is an extremely widespread phenomenon, involving over 200 million children under
seventeen years of age (ILO, 2017). More importantly, it is often regarded as one of the main
causes of the perpetuation of poverty in the developing world as it typically forces children to
abandon school at an early stage, thus interfering with their human capital development. Several
explanations for the existence of child labor in poor countries have been proposed in the literature.1
However, there is ample consensus that child labor would decrease with improvements in house-
hold’s economic conditions.2 This view has motivated the use of poverty alleviation programs
as means to contrast child labor. The vast majority of such programs provide benefits to vulner-
able households which are delivered either in-kind or in-cash (Honorati et al., 2015). Although
the literature has studied the effects of several social protection programs on child labour, little is
known about the effectiveness of one transfer scheme against another. This paper investigates the
relationship between child labor and the provision of in-kind versus cash transfers by exploiting
experimentally induced variation in the transfer modality.
Most of the recent literature about the impact of poverty alleviation programs on child labor
focused on a new generation of programs whose benefits are delivered conditional on children
attending school. Conditional cash transfers are currently used in many low and middle income
countries and they are often found to lead to increased school participation and lower levels of
child labor (see Fiszbein and Schady, 2009 for a review). Although relatively less studied, there is
evidence that conditional in-kind transfers can also change the time allocation of children. Raval-
lion and Wodon (2000) find that a food subsidy program conditional on children attendance at
primary school increased school participation and reduced child labor in Bangladesh. Edmonds
and Shrestha (2015) show that an in-kind stipend conditional on school attendance reduced child
labor in Nepal, although the effect did not persist once the incentive was removed. However,
the literature on conditional transfer programs can not inform about how child labor and schooling
decisions respond to changes in household’s economic conditions, since the conditionality require-
ment changes the opportunity cost of schooling. In other words, it is not possible to determine how
much of the reduction in child labor is due to the transfer per se and how much it is driven by the
program conditionality.
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The empirical evidence about the child labor response to unconditional transfers, either in-kind
or in-cash, is relatively more scarce. On one hand, Edmonds (2006) finds that child labor declines
and schooling increases after an anticipated expansion of a pension scheme in South Africa. Ed-
monds and Schady (2012) document large reductions in child labor for families receiving a cash
transfer in Ecuador. Similarly, other studies in Malawi and Mexico have found higher school at-
tendance among children living in households that are given cash transfers (Baird et al., 2011; de
Brauw and Hoddinott, 2011). On the other hand, to my knowledge there is no evidence in the
literature about the impact of unconditional transfers in-kind on the time allocation of children.
The first contribution of this paper is to provide novel evidence about the effects of an uncon-
ditional transfer in-kind on child labor. Second, and more importantly, by exploiting experimental
variation in the transfer modality, this is the first paper to study if the impact of welfare programs
on child labor and schooling depends on whether the transfers are given in-kind or in-cash. I in-
vestigate these issues by studying how child time allocation responds to the Programa de Apoyo
Alimentario (PAL), a governmental program providing either a cash transfer or a food basket to
poor households in rural Mexico. The evaluation design of the program relies on an experimen-
tal trial in which approximately 200 villages were randomly assigned to receive either the cash
transfer or the food basket, or to a control group that received nothing. In addition, pre- and post-
intervention surveys collected information about the work participation and school attendance of
children within the household, as well as about program take-up. Therefore, the PAL experiment
provides a unique setting for the purpose of comparing the effects of cash versus in-kind transfers
on child time allocation.
The empirical specification compares the change over time in the labor supply of participating
children vis-a-vis the change over time in the labor supply of non-participating children. As the
choice of participating in the program is endogenous, I use the random assignment of the treatment
at the village level as an instrument for program participation. The results show that the cash
transfer reduced participation in the labour market and increased schooling for children of high
school age (15-16 years old at baseline).3 The estimated impact of the cash transfer implies a
reduction of about 10 working hours a week, and an increase in school attendance of 12 percentage
points, as compared to children in the control group. On the extensive margin, the cash transfer
reduced child labor by 9 percentage points, with even larger and significant effects when looking
at paid employment. By contrast, the estimated impacts of the transfer in-kind are smaller and not
statistically different from zero.
3As I will discuss in Section 5, for younger children neither the cash nor the in-kind transfer had an effect on child
labor and schooling, which could be explained by binding child labour regulations.
To shed more light on the significantly larger effect of the cash transfer vis-a-vis the in-kind
transfer, the paper investigates the heterogeneity of the child labor response to the PAL program
across the distribution of household income. This focus is motivated by existing evidence that
the welfare gains for recipients of the PAL in-kind transfer are increasing with household income
(Tagliati, 2018). This regressive effect of the food basket might thus explain the differential impact
of the in-kind versus the cash transfer on child time allocation.
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This source of heterogeneity is studied not only empirically but also through the lens of a sim-
ple model which provides a theoretical reference to read the empirical results. The model shares
important characteristics of the theoretical literature on child labor and, in particular, the idea that
preferences for schooling are characterized by a luxury axiom (Basu and Van, 1998; Soares et al.,
2012). Under this assumption, children work full-time when household income is not sufficient to
guarantee that consumption is above subsistence. The model has three possible solutions for the
child’s time allocation (full-time work, work and schooling, full-time schooling) which depend on
two income thresholds at which the household moves from one solution to another. This implies
that households at different points of the income distribution adjust child labor decisions on differ-
ent margins after receiving government transfers. Transfer recipients at the bottom of the income
distribution reduce child labor only on the intensive margin. Recipients in the middle of the income
distribution adjust child labor both on the intensive and on the extensive margin, while there is no
effect for recipients at the top. As for the differential effects of cash versus in-kind transfers on
child labor supply, theoretically the effect of a transfer in-kind is bounded above by the effect of
an equal-value cash transfer, and strictly lower if the transfer in-kind is extra-marginal.4
Because the data lack several information that would be required to estimate the model, I
rather test its predictions exploiting the randomized design of the program. I estimate the impact
of the PAL program for children of high school age from households in the first, second and
third tertile of a proxy measure of household baseline income.5 The results are in line with the
theoretical predictions. More precisely, I find that children from cash recipient households in the
first income tertile work about 12 hours a week less than untreated children with similar socio-
economic background but, consistently with the model, there is no significant reduction on the
extensive margin. For cash recipients in the middle of the income distribution, there are significant
reductions over both the intensive and the extensive margin of child labor, while no effect is found
for children in the top income tertile. Compared to the cash transfer, the transfer in-kind caused
similar reductions in child labor for households in the middle tertile of the income distribution, but
it was ineffective for children in the bottom tertile, a result which is consistent with the regressive
4A transfer in-kind is said to be extra-marginal if consumption of the subsidized good under the transfer is larger
than what the consumer would have consumed of that good under an equal-value cash transfer.
5As I will discuss in Section 3, to proxy for the unobserved income of the household, I construct an index of the
socioeconomic status of the household using information on ownership of durables and housing characteristics.
nature of the PAL in-kind transfer. In terms of magnitude, the largest effects are found among
households in the middle tertile: both transfers reduced child labour on the extensive margins by
22-23 percentage points, and by 8 to 14 hours a week on the intensive margin.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that, in addition to the literature on child labor, this paper is
also related to the literature on the relative merits of cash versus in-kind transfers (see Currie and
Gahvari, 2008 for a review). Whereas cash transfers are praised for having lower administrative
costs and for being fungible, in-kind transfers might be preferred when there are externalities from
consumption of some merit goods or to induce the non-poor to self-select out of social protec-
tion programs (Garfinkel, 1973; Nichols and Zeckhauser, 1982; Blackorby and Donaldson, 1988).
Other theoretical works suggest that extra-marginal in-kind transfers provide lower disincentives to
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6There is an extensive literature studying the effects of either cash or in-kind transfers on adult employment. In
advanced economies, negative effects on adult labor supply have documented among recipients of the Food Stamp
Program (Fraker and Moffitt, 1988; Hagstrom, 1996; Hoynes and Schanzenbach, 2012), whereas Jones and Marinescu
(2018) finds that a universal and permanent cash grant in Alaska had no effect on household employment. In develop-
ing countries, null or even positive effects on adult labor supply have being documented among recipients of uncondi-
tional cash transfers (Ardington et al., 2009; Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016; Salehi-Isfahani and Mostafavi-Dehzooei,
2018). On the contrary, other studies found that cash or in-kind benefits led to a reduction in work participation (Sahn
and Alderman, 1996; de Carvalho Filho, 2008).
7Other studies using data from the PAL programs include Avitabile (2012), who studies the effect of the program
on health behavior and health outcomes. Cunha (2014) studies the extra-marginality of the in-kind transfer and the
program effects on household consumption and nutrition. Tagliati (2018) estimates a model of demand to quantify
household welfare for in-kind recipients, finding that the in-kind transfer was on average more cost-efficient than the
cash transfer but regressive. Cunha et al. (2019) show that, by lowering the residual demand of the subsidized goods,
the in-kind transfer caused a reduction in local food prices.
8This section is largely based on the classical theory of labor supply under cash and in-kind transfers (Murray,
1980; Leonesio, 1988; Munro, 1989; Gahvari, 1994), but it is applied to child labor rather than to adult labor supply.
2.1 Child labor under cash and in-kind transfers
Consider the maximization problem of a unitary household formed by one parent and one child.8
Assume that the household has preferences over two consumption goods: c is a composite con-
sumption good which is freely purchased in the market at a price pc; z is a composite consumption
good which is possibly subsidized in-kind by a government, and whose price is denoted with pz.
The household also values the time the child spends at school, which is denoted with s.9 Hence,
household utility is given by U(c,z,s). The child’s total time, T , is allocated between schooling
and labor according to the equation h+ s = T , where h denotes the hours of work of the child. As
the focus of the paper is on child labor, I assume that parents always inelastically supply their time
endowment in the labor market, and that parental labor supply is not affected by the provision of
government transfers.10
9The household values the schooling of the child because it might expect higher educated children to get larger
future expected earnings. Returns to education in Mexico could indeed be substantial. Parker (1999) estimates that
any additional year of schooling increases wages by approximately 8% in urban Mexico.
10In the context of the PAL program, Skoufias et al. (2008) show that neither the cash nor the in-kind transfer
changed the work participation of the adult population. In Section 5.3, I provide further evidence about the lack of this
mechanism across the distribution of household income.
The other actor in this economy is a government, which can either provide a transfer in-kind for
good z, denoted with z¯, or an equal-value cash transfer x¯ = pzz¯. In this setting, a transfer in-kind is
work as compared to cash-equivalent transfers (Murray, 1980; Leonesio, 1988; Munro, 1989, Gah-
vari, 1994).6 In the context of the PAL program, Skoufias et al. (2008) do not find any significant
change in the labor supply of adults receiving either the cash or the in-kind transfer.7 This paper
contributes to this area of research by studying child time allocation responses to cash and in-kind
transfers, documenting larger reductions in child labor among cash vis-a-vis in-kind recipients.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and
the child labor model. Section 3 describes the PAL program and the data. Section 4 discusses the
empirical strategy. The empirical results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
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e(pc,w, z¯,u) = min
c,s
{pcc+ws :U(c, z¯,s)≥ u} . (1)
The solution of this problem gives the “constrained” compensated demands for c and s, c =
c(pc,w, z¯,u) and s = s(pc,w, z¯,u). Clearly, the child’s labor supply can immediately be derived
from the time constraint. Let u∗ be the highest utility level attainable by the household from the
solution of problem (1). An equivalent formulation is one in which the household faces prices pc
and p∗z and chooses c, z and s to minimize the “unconstrained” expenditure function
e(pc, p∗z ,w,u
∗) = min
c,z,s
{
pcc+ p∗z z+ws :U(c,z,s)≥ u∗
}
. (2)
Here, p∗z is the virtual price of good z at which the household would freely choose to consume
z¯ = z(pc, p∗z ,w,u
∗). (3)
It is straightforward to show that, in order to reach the utility level u∗, household income must
be equal to y∗ = y+ p∗z z¯. Moreover, since the household would not have consumed z = z¯ under
an equal-value cash transfer, it must be that p∗z < pz. This implies that an extra-marginal transfer
in-kind is equivalent to: (i) an implicit increase in household income from y to y∗ (income effect);
and (ii) an implicit reduction in the price of the transferred good from pz to p∗z (“price” effect). In
the next subsection, I present a simple model and use these observations to study how income and
price effects change child labor decisions upon the provision of an extra-marginal transfer in-kind.
2.2 The model
I assume that household utility is quasilinear in schooling and that the degree of substitutabil-
ity between consumption goods can be represented by a generalized CES utility function, i.e.
U(c,z,s) = [cσ + zσ ]
γ
σ +αs.11 In order for v(c,z) = [cσ + zσ ]
γ
σ to be increasing and quasi-concave
11The model presented in this section, and particularly the functional form for household utility, are similar to Soares
et al. (2012) but deeply differ in both motivation and objectives. While Soares et al. (2012) develop a model of child
labor and schooling to disentangle income and substitution effects of changes in household economic conditions, I use
a similar framework to study the heterogeneous response of child labor to cash and in-kind subsidies.
exactly z = z¯. In other words,
said to be infra-marginal if household consumption of good z would be at least as large as z¯ under
a cash-equivalent transfer x¯. On the contrary, if household demand for good z under x¯ is strictly
lower than z¯, the transfer is extra-marginal.
Assuming that s is a normal good, a cash transfer increases schooling, and consequently de-
creases child labor, through a standard income effect. By definition, the same effect can be obtained
by the provision of an infra-marginal transfer in-kind. If instead the transfer is extra-marginal, the
household maximizesU(c,z,s) subject to z= z¯ and the budget constraint pcc≤w(T −s)+y, where
w represents the wage that the child earns in the labor market and y is a source of income exoge-
nous to child labor. Equivalently, one could write the household problem as the minimization of
the following expenditure function subject to z = z¯:
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max
c,z,s
[cσ + zσ ]
γ
σ +αs s.t
pcc+ pzz ≤ w(T − s)+ y¯+ ε. (4)
A convenient solution for this problem, which exploits the separability between s and v(c,z),
proceeds in two steps. In the first step, the objective function is maximized with respect to c and
max
m,s
[c(m)σ + z(m)σ ]
γ
σ +αs s.t
m = w(T − s)+ y¯+ ε. (5)
It is easy to verify that the first order conditions for this problem are
πγmγ−1 = μ (6)
α
>
=
<
μw, (7)
where μ denotes the Lagrangian multiplier and π is equal to
π =
[
p
σ
σ−1
c + p
σ
σ−1
z
] γ(1−σ)
σ
. (8)
The solution of both steps of the maximization procedure are presented in Appendix A. Plugging
(6) into (7) gives α <=
>
πγmγ−1w, which relates the marginal utility of schooling to the marginal
cost of foregone child labor earnings. Depending on the sign of this inequality, the solution to the
household problem can lie in any of the following three cases.
in c and z, let σ < 1 and 0 < γ ≤ 1. Moreover, assume that α > 0 so that household utility is in-
creasing in schooling. As before, the household budget constraint is given by pcc+ pzz ≤ wh+ y,
where pc and pz are respectively the prices of c and z; w represents the wage that a working child
earns in the labor market; h denotes the hours of work of the child; and y is a source of income
exogenous to child labor. More specifically, I assume that y is given by the sum of government
transfers, y¯, and parental labor earnings ε , that is y = y¯+ε . In order to study how households with
different income levels would respond to the provision of government transfers, I further assume
that y¯ is fixed and common across all households, while ε varies across households according to
some unspecified distribution G. If the child’s total time T is allocated between schooling and
labor according to the equation h+ s = T , the household problem can be expressed as follows
z, taking s as given and defining m ≡ w(T − s)+ y¯+ ε to be the household potential income for a
given choice of s. Let c(m) and z(m) be the solutions for c and z as a function of m. In the second
step, c(m) and z(m) are used into (4) to compute the “partial” indirect utility of the household
conditional on s. Hence the problem becomes the one of choosing m and s to maximize
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Case 1: Work only If the marginal utility of schooling is lower than its marginal cost, i.e. if
α < πγmγ−1w, the child works full time (i.e., h = T and s = 0). Plugging the budget constraint,
which is given by m = wT + y¯+ ε , into the inequality above gives
ε <
(
α
πγ
1
w
) 1
γ−1
−wT − y¯ ≡ εL. (9)
Case 2: Schooling only This case is represented by the inequality α > πγmγ−1w, with h = 0
and s = T . Since the child does not work, the budget constraint is given by m = y¯+ ε . Plugging m
into the inequality we have
ε >
(
α
πγ
1
w
) 1
γ−1
− y¯ ≡ εH . (10)
Case 3: Work and schooling This case is represented by the equality α = πγmγ−1w with h > 0
and s > 0. Using the budget constraint, which is given by m = wh+ y¯+ ε , we can find that
h = 1w
[(
α
πγ
1
w
) 1
γ−1 − y¯− ε
]
or, alternatively, we can derive that ε =
(
α
πγ
1
w
) 1
γ−1 −wh− y¯. Since
0 ≤ h ≤ T , we have a range of values of ε such that the child works and goes to school. In
particular, h > 0 and s > 0 for
εL =
(
α
πγ
1
w
) 1
γ−1
−wT − y¯ ≤ ε ≤
(
α
πγ
1
w
) 1
γ−1
− y¯ = εH .
Hours of work as a function of income From the solution to the model, we can derive the
optimal choice for child labor supply h∗ as a function of household income ε (net of child labor
earnings and government transfers). This is given by
h∗ =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
T i f ε < εL
1
w
[(
α
πγ
1
w
) 1
γ−1 − y¯− ε
]
i f εL ≤ ε ≤ εH
0 i f ε > εH
(11)
and can be represented by the graph in Figure 1. The three cases discussed above correspond to
the three regions in the graph identified by the thresholds εL and εH . If household income is below
εL, the child works full time. If household income is between εL and εH , the child works and goes
to school. Finally, for income levels above εH the child goes to school full time.
It is important to remark that the solution for the child labor supply depends crucially on the
quasi-linearity of the utility function in schooling. This assumption about household preferences
embeds the idea, common to some of the child labor literature, that household demand for child
schooling follows a so called “luxury axiom” (Basu and Van, 1998; Soares et al., 2012). Under this
assumption, for very low levels of household income, consumption falls below subsistence and, in
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this case, the child’s time is allocated entirely into the labor market to maximize utility from con-
sumption. The threshold εL can thus be interpreted as the level of income below which household
consumption is below subsistence. Only if household income is above εL the household is willing
to forego at least part of what the child could earn in the labor market. Another implication of this
assumption is that even relatively small changes in household income could have large effects on
child labor if they allow households to move from below to above the subsistence threshold.
The effects of cash and in-kind transfers on child labor supply A cash transfer can be inter-
preted as an increase in the household allotment of government transfers y¯. As it is apparent from
equations (9) and (10), the thresholds εL and εH are both decreasing in y¯. Hence, a cash transfer
shifts to the left both thresholds in Figure 1, say to ε ′L and ε ′H . This determines a reduction in child
labor but on different margins across the income distribution: (i) children in households whose
income is between ε ′L and εL reduce the amount of working hours (change in the intensive margin
of labor supply); and (ii) households whose income is between εL and εH decrease child labor over
the intensive margin (in the region between εL and ε ′H) and over the extensive margin (in the region
between ε ′H and εH). For children in households whose income is above εH no change occurs. The
effect on schooling could easily be obtained from the change in working hours: given that, in the
model, a child can only work or go to school, we have that Δs =−Δh .
Consider now a transfer in-kind z¯ whose market value coincides with the value of the cash
transfer, i.e. x¯ = pzz¯. By definition, if the transfer is infra-marginal for a given household, it
has exactly the same effect of an equal-value cash transfer. Instead, as discussed in Section 2.1,
an extra-marginal transfer in-kind has both an income effect (i.e., it corresponds to an increase
in income from y¯+ ε to y¯+ p∗z z¯+ ε) and a “price” effect (i.e., it corresponds to a reduction in
the price of good z from pz to p∗z ). This has two implications for child labor supply. First, the
increase in income determines a left-shift of the thresholds εL and εH in Figure 1. However, since
p∗z z¯ < pzz¯ = x¯, the magnitude of the income effect of an extra-marginal transfer in-kind on labor
supply is lower than the magnitude of the income effect of a cash transfer. Second, the price effect
also shifts the thresholds since the term
(
α
πγ
1
w
) 1
γ−1 depends on pz through the coefficient π shown
Figure 1: Labor supply as a function of household income
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12This result is consistent with the theoretical literature on adult labor supply under cash and in-kind transfers
(Gahvari, 1994).
13If the cross-price elasticity between c and z is not too small, then a household would substitute away from c at a
relatively large rate even for small changes in the price of z. In such a case, the implicit reduction in the price of good
z, which is required in order for the household to optimally consume z¯, is quite small and, therefore, the income effect
is likely to be larger than the price effect. In the context of PAL, in which the in-kind transfer is a food basket and most
of the household’s budget is spent on food, the substitutability between subsidized and non-subsidized goods might be
relatively high, in which case the income effect might dominate the price effect.
14Liconsa is a subsidized milk program. Oportunidades is the well-known conditional cash transfer program of
Mexico. PAL villages were not included in Oportunidades because they did not have close enough health facilities
3.1 The PAL program and experiment
PAL is a social protection program which operates in around 5,000 rural villages throughout Mex-
ico. It was launched by the government at the end of 2003 with the objective of improving the
living conditions of the targeted population. Eligibility to the program was determined through a
two-stage procedure. First, villages were deemed eligible if: (i) they have a population of less than
2,500 inhabitants; (ii) they are highly marginalized, as defined by the National Council for Popula-
tion criteria; (iii) they do not receive other transfer programs, such as Liconsa or Oportunidades;14
and/or schools to comply with the conditional requirements of the program. As a consequence, PAL villages are, in
general, poorer and more marginalized than rural villages in Oportunidades. As I will discuss in more detail, self-
reported data on receipt of other transfer programs suggest that some PAL beneficiaries also received benefits from
Oportunidades and Liconsa. In the empirical analysis, I include controls for receiving such programs and test the
robustness of the results to the exclusion of households receiving scholarships from Oportunidades.
in equation (8). To determine the sign of a change in pz, I differentiate εL (or, equivalently, εH)
with respect to pz which gives
(iv) they are accessible and close enough to a store managed by DICONSA, the governmental
∂εL
∂ pz
=
[
α
γ
1
w
] 1
γ−1 π
γ
1−γ
(1− γ)
∂π
∂ pz
.
Given the restrictions α > 0 and 0< γ ≤ 1, which are required to ensure that utility is increasing
in all arguments and concave in c and z, it is immediate that the sign of the derivative is equal to
the sign of ∂π∂ pz . In Appendix A, I prove that
∂π
∂ pz < 0, which implies that the (virtual) reduction
in the price of good z determines a right shift in the thresholds εL and εH or, in other words, a
positive effect on child labor. While the sum of the income and of the “price” effect is theoretically
ambiguous, it is clear from the above analysis that, overall, labor supply would be higher under an
in-kind transfer rather than under an equal-value cash transfer.12
In summary, the model presented in this section gives some testable implications on the effect
of a cash transfer on child labor. It predicts a reduction on the intensive margin of child labor, for
households at the bottom and in the middle of the income distribution, and no effect for households
at the top. It further predicts a reduction on the extensive margin of child labor only for households
in the middle of the income distribution. Regarding the effects of a transfer in-kind, if the income
effect is larger than the “price” effect, we should expect similar effects but of lower magnitude.13
3 The PAL program and the data
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agency in charge of administering the program.15 Second, within eligible villages, all households
that scored below a means-test poverty threshold were offered the program.
Concurrent with its nationwide implementation, 206 villages, among the universe of eligible
localities, were randomly selected in order to participate into an experimental trial. Each village
was randomly assigned to one of three treatment arms: (i) an in-kind treatment arm (103 villages);
(ii) a cash treatment arm (53 villages); (iii) a control group, which received nothing (50 villages).
Villages in the in-kind treatment arm received a monthly food basket containing ten commodities,
which were selected by nutritionists to provide a balanced diet.16 Villages in the cash treatment
arm were instead offered a monthly cash transfer of 150 pesos (approximately US$ 13), which
corresponds to the purchasing cost of the food basket to the Mexican government in wholesale
markets. However, the average cost of the basket in recipients’ local markets was about 205 pesos
(approximately US$ 18).17 Hence, the face value of the transfer in-kind was on average 33 percent
larger than the value of the cash transfer.
At face value, the in-kind transfer represented, on average, 11 percent of household’s baseline
total expenditure, whereas the cash transfer corresponded to about 13 percent of total expenditure
at baseline. The transfers were not conditional on family size and, whenever possible, they were
given to a female household member (typically the spouse of the household head). Estimates of
child wages in PAL villages are not available, but it is possible to relate the size of the transfers to
the average wage that a child working full-time could earn in other poor rural villages in Mexico.
Based on this evidence, I estimate that the cash transfer represents between 25 to 30 percent of the
average child wage, while the nominal value of the in-kind transfer represents between 33 to 40
percent.18
g
15Accessibility is defined as the village being within 2.5 km from a road. Similarly, a village is considered to be
close to a DICONSA store if it is within 2.5 km from it.
16The commodities are corn flour, rice, beans, pasta soup, biscuits, fortified milk powder, vegetable oil, lentils,
breakfast cereals and canned fish. The list of goods, the quantities transferred per month and the average value of the
PAL box are reported in Table B1 in the Appendix.
17This is due to the fact that the government could exploit substantial economies of scale from procuring large
quantities of goods in wholesale markets. These are only partially offset by the transportation, stocking and other
administrative costs of the in-kind modality, which correspond to about 22 percent of the purchasing cost of the
transfer. The administrative costs of the cash transfer are, instead, about 12 percent of the value of the subsidy (see
Ventura-Alfaro et al., 2011 for more details about the costs of the two transfer modalities).
18Schultz (2004) estimates that the average monthly wage of a child working full-time in Oportunidades villages
was about 380 pesos in 1999. Applying the growth rate either of the CPI or of the hourly wage in the manufacturing
sector between 1999 and 2003, I estimate that the average nominal earnings of a child in 2003 amounts to 500-600
pesos (approximately US$ 44-53).
An additional feature of the program is the fact that, for a random half of villages in the in-
kind treatment arm and for all villages in the cash treatment arm, the transfers were intended to
be conditional on adult members’ participation in monthly classes which covered topics related to
healthy eating, nutrition and hygiene practices.19 Classes were held by members of a Committee
of Beneficiaries, which were previously selected among educated members within the village and
19Since one of the objectives of the experimental design was to study the effect of the classes over and above the
effect of the in-kind transfer itself, some localities were randomly assigned to receive a pure unconditional in-kind
transfer. Avitabile (2012) studied the effect of class participation on health outcomes, documenting improvements in
the health behavior of women in the in-kind plus classes group as compared to women in the in-kind group.
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who received special training for teaching the classes. However, although the courses were meant
to be a mandatory requirements for the receipt of the transfer, no household was ever denied bene-
fits for not attending (Skoufias et al., 2008).20 In addition to the lack of enforcement, classes were
taught also in villages in the in-kind without classes treatment arm. Because of the contamination
of this program component, in the paper I pool together all villages that received transfers in-kind,
irrespective of whether they were originally randomized in or out of class participation.
For the purpose of studying the effects of PAL on child labor, one might be worried that class
participation might have had some direct effect on the time allocation of children. This might
occur, for example, if parents were forced to reduce their participation in the labor market in order
to attend the classes, possibly compensating the reduction in earnings with increased child labor.
However, the fact that parents were only required to attend one class per month, and that class
participation was not enforced (see Appendix B), makes this extremely unlikely. Indeed, previous
evaluations of PAL did not find any effect of the program on adult labor supply (Skoufias et al.,
2008). Another possibility is that this requirement fostered the interaction with other households in
the village, and that parents attending the classes might be more likely to under-report child labor
if this is stigmatized within the community. However, according to the Federal Labor Act (Ley
Federal de Trabajo), child labor is regulated in Mexico up to age 15. As I will discuss, PAL had an
effect on child labor only for children who were 16 or older at follow-up. As labor regulations are
not binding for children in this age group, it is unlikely that the results are driven by differential
“stigma effects” for class participants versus non-participants.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the conditionality requirement of PAL is very different from
those of other programs in the literature, which typically require kids from beneficiary households
to comply with specific schooling requirements. While such programs provide a direct disincentive
towards child labor by changing the relative price of schooling, this mechanism is not present in
the context of PAL in which the only requirement is parental (as apposed to children) attendance
20According to the program rules, household were supposed to be excluded from the program if they missed more
than two consecutive classes or a total of four classes in a year. Follow-up data confirm the lack of enforcement of
such rules. Indeed, whereas households received on average 13 transfers since the start of PAL, they reported to have
attended only 4 classes on average (see Appendix B).
In each of the 206 villages included in the experiment, around 33 households were randomly se-
lected to participate in pre- and post-intervention surveys. The baseline survey was conducted
between October 2003 and April 2004, while follow-up data were collected from October to De-
cember 2005. The PAL transfers began to be delivered after the completion of the baseline survey.
The survey provides information on school attendance, the main occupation and the total number
of working hours in the last seven days for all individuals older than twelve. Data on household
expenditure and ownership of assets are also available.
to sporadic courses. Therefore, in the subsequent analysis I interpret the estimated impact of PAL
on child labor and schooling as arising from unconditional transfers.
3.2 Data, sample and summary statistics
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The follow-up survey provides extensive information about the receipt of the PAL transfers,
including the number of benefits received, their timing and the person beneficiary of the program
within the household. About 90 percent of households reported to receive transfers from PAL in
any treatment arm (see Appendix A for a detailed discussion about program take-up). Due to the
lack of administrative data on household eligibility, it is not possible to determine if the remaining
10 percent of households did not participate because of ineligibility or imperfect compliance.
Of the original 206 experimental villages, nine villages were excluded from the analysis for
various reasons: two localities were excluded because households started to receive PAL prior
to the baseline survey; two villages are geographically contiguous, possibly violating the Stable
Unit Treatment Assumption (SUTVA); two villages refused to participate in the program; one
control locality was excluded because it received the in-kind treatment; two localities were dropped
because all households in these villages were receiving Oportunidades, contrary to program rules.
Within the remaining 197 sample villages, I have dropped households with incomplete surveys,
as well as attrited households and individuals. The estimation sample includes 2,590 children aged
12 to 16 at baseline who are observed in both surveys. The sample of households is derived
selecting those 1,839 households with at least one child aged 12 to 16 at baseline. The choice to
restrict the sample to this age group is dictated by two reasons. First, there is no information on the
labor supply of children younger than 12. Second, by the age of 16 children should have progressed
into high school (preparatoria or bachillerato), which usually ends around age 18. Since the
follow-up survey was taken after one and a half year, and because enrollment into university after
age 18 is extremely rare within this sample, choosing age 16 as a cutoff guarantees that a substantial
number of children in this age group face a decision between enrolling or completing high school
and start working.
Attrition was rather low in the sample, being around 12 percent at the household level and 21
percent at the child level. The attrition rate for 12-16 years old children is slightly lower for in-
kind recipients than for the control group. However, there is no significant difference between the
attrition rates of cash recipients and the control group, nor between the attrition rates of the cash
and in-kind treatment groups (see Appendix B).
The first three columns in Table 1 show the means of selected household and children char-
acteristics by treatment group. Columns 4 to 6 report the mean difference between any treatment
group and another. As we can see from the top panel of Table 1, households in different treatment
arms are overall balanced at baseline in terms of household composition, receipt of other welfare
programs and per capita expenditure levels. Regarding children characteristics, the bottom panel
of Table 1 shows that the randomization was somehow less successful. There are significantly less
male children in the cash treatment group as compared to the control group. Moreover, children are
significantly older in localities in the in-kind and cash treatment arms. Despite these differences,
children in any of the treatment groups do not work significantly more than those in the control
group, both on the intensive and on the extensive margin: although work participation and hours
worked are slightly higher for cash and in-kind recipients, the difference with the control group is
not statistically significant.
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21The possible answers are: work, look for a job, student, housework/housekeeping, retired, unable to work.
The statistics in Table 1 are also useful to characterize the targeted population. Households
are quite large, with about six members on average. Around 17 percent of the households include
one old member, and around 23 percent of them have at least one household member speaking an
indigenous language. The sample is also quite poor and low educated. The average number of
years of schooling of the household head is around four years. The average value of household
monthly expenditure is around 2200 pesos (approximately US$ 190) and the share of food con-
sumption is about 65 percent of total consumption. Sample children have completed six years of
formal education on average. The average school attendance rate is slightly lower than 80 percent.
Approximately 18 percent of the children in the sample worked in the last seven days. Among
working children, the average number of weekly working hours is about 34.
3.3 Child labor and household income
For any individual who is at least 12 years old, the survey asks first to report the main activity in
the last seven days;21 it then asks if the respondent was involved in any working activity in addition
to the main occupation in the last seven days. The measure of the extensive margin of child labor
combines both answers and is defined as an indicator equal to one if either the child worked as the
main activity or was involved in any other working activity in the last seven days. For all working
individuals, the survey also asks to report the total number of working hours in the last seven days.
This is the intensive margin measure of child labor used in the paper.
This definition of child labor, which is the preferred one throughout the paper, incorporates
both market work and unpaid work in the family business (but it excludes housework). In some
empirical results (see Section 5.1), I also distinguish between paid and unpaid work but, admittedly,
in the absence of data on child earnings, this classification is only tentative. In particular, I define
“unpaid work” as an indicator equal to one if the respondent reported “unpaid work in the family
farm or business” as the type of working activity in the last seven days, and I define “paid work”
as a residual category comprising all working activities others than “unpaid work in the family
farm or business”.22 In the sample, about 11 percent of 12-16 years old children worked for pay
at baseline, while about 7 percent worked in an unpaid activity in the family business, with no
significant differences across treatment groups (see Table 1).
For easiness of exposition, the distinction between market and unpaid family work is not in-
cluded in the simple model presented in Section 2.2. However, this might have implications for
household response across the intensive versus extensive margins of child labor. Indeed, while
hours of work in the family business can easily be adjusted, hours of work in the market might be
indivisible and they are more likely to displace schooling. However, even in the sample of children
22It is possible that this classification overstates paid work since respondents who reported some working activities,
such as “craftsman” or “construction worker”, might be involved in them both outside the family business for pay or
inside the family business without pay. Another reason to prefer a more comprehensive definition is that the survey
asked only about the total number of weekly working hours, and therefore it is not possible to construct separate
measures of the work intensity for occupations in and outside the family business.
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Table 1: Baseline household and child characteristics by treatment group
Number of household members 6.05 5.95 6.04 -0.09 -0.01 -0.09
(2.22) (2.12) (2.19) (0.24) (0.28) (0.25)
Number of children aged 0 to 5 0.62 0.57 0.57 -0.06 -0.05 -0.01
(0.90) (0.82) (0.88) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08)
Education of the household head 3.94 4.11 3.72 0.17 -0.22 0.40
(3.53) (3.49) (3.61) (0.30) (0.35) (0.32)
Indigenous household 0.27 0.23 0.17 -0.04 -0.10 0.07
(0.44) (0.42) (0.37) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07)
Old member in the household 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.03 0.03 0.00
(0.35) (0.38) (0.38) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Female head 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.00 -0.01 0.01
(0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Received Oportunidades 0.17 0.11 0.11 -0.05 -0.06 0.01
(0.37) (0.32) (0.31) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
Received Liconsa 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Per capita monthly expenditure 420.99 393.30 398.86 -27.69 -22.13 -5.56
(283.18) (249.04) (238.94) (31.68) (33.70) (27.65)
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Hours of work are equal to zero for children not working in the last seven
days. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors, clustered at the village level, for the differences in columns (4) to
(6) and standard deviations elsewhere.
Control In-Kind Cash Diff. (2)-(1) Diff. (3)-(1) Diff. (2)-(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: household characteristics
Panel B: children characteristics
Male 0.59 0.55 0.53 -0.04 -0.05* 0.02
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Age 13.61 13.76 13.73 0.15** 0.12* 0.03
(1.33) (1.38) (1.43) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
Years of completed education 6.10 6.26 6.06 0.17 -0.04 0.21
(2.28) (2.20) (2.39) (0.19) (0.24) (0.21)
Attends school 0.81 0.76 0.78 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02
(0.39) (0.43) (0.42) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Any work in the last seven days 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.02 0.04 -0.02
(0.37) (0.39) (0.40) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Paid work in the last seven days 0.11 0.11 0.12 -0.00 0.01 -0.01
(0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Unpaid work in the last seven days 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.03 -0.02
(0.24) (0.25) (0.28) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Hours of work in the last seven days 5.48 5.88 7.08 0.40 1.61 -1.21
(15.02) (15.25) (16.85) (1.02) (1.33) (1.17)
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not working in the family business, full-time market-related work is relatively rare as children are
often employed as day laborers or in occupations which might have relatively flexible working
hours, such as street sellers or domestic employees. This can be seen by looking at the distribution
of working hours in the last seven days for the sample of working children at baseline, which is
reported in Figure 2. Although about 10 percent of working children worked for 48 hours in the
last week (i.e., the number of hours corresponding to a full-time job of eight hours per day within
a working week of six days), more than 60 percent of children worked less than 40 hours. Indeed,
the fact that there are not big spikes in the distribution of working hours might suggest that house-
holds are able to adjust the labor supply of their children on the intensive margin in response to
changes in household income.
The PAL survey does not report information on household income nor on wages. In order
to study the heterogeneity of the program impact across the income distribution, I use data on the
characteristics of the dwellings and on the ownership of durables, and define an income index to be
the first principal component within a Principal Component Analysis (PCA).23 More specifically,
housing characteristics include the material of the floor, walls and roof, the source of water, the
23Filmer and Pritchett (2001) show that indices constructed using PCA starting from data on ownership of durables
and house characteristics provide good proxies for household income.
type of sanitation facility, the presence of a kitchen, the number of rooms and bedrooms and
the availability of electricity. The list of durables includes radio, television, video player, phone,
computer, fridge, washing machine, stove, water heater, motorbike and car.
In the model presented in Section 2, whether a household adjusts child labor on the intensive or
extensive margin in response to the provision of cash or in-kind transfers depends on its position
Figure 2: Distribution of hours worked in the last seven days in the baseline sample
Notes: Hours of work are conditional on working in the last seven days. The sample includes 12-16 years old children
at baseline.
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within the income distribution as determined by income thresholds which are functions of both
exogenous variables and of model parameters. Estimating such thresholds is not feasible since,
apart from some stylized simplifications within the model, the survey lacks data on some variables
(specifically, child wages) on which the thresholds depend. However, if preferences for child
welfare are characterized by a luxury axiom, the impact of the transfers should vary across the
distribution of household income as described by the model predictions. Hence, in order to mimic
the structure of the model, I classify households into tertiles of the baseline income proxy discussed
above. For simplicity of exposition, throughout the paper I refer to these three subsamples as to
the “Bottom” group (first tertile), “Middle” group (second tertile) and “Top” group (last tertile).
Table 2 shows how child labor differs across the income distribution by looking at the average
participation in the labor market and hours of work by income groups for children of different
cohorts. Unsurprisingly, two clear patterns emerge. First, child labor supply increases with age:
while only 10 percent of 12 years old kids work, by the age of 16 around 32 percent are engaged
Table 2: Child labor by age and household income tertiles at baseline
Child labor in Mexico is regulated by the Ley Federal de Trabajo. The law prohibits any form of
employment of children below age fourteen and of children older than fourteen but younger than
Notes: "Any work" is an indicator for the child working in the last seven days. Hours of work are equal to zero for
children not working in the last seven days. "Bottom", "Medium" and "Top" denote respectively, the first, second and
third tertile of the baseline income distribution as proxied by the income index constructed as reported in Section 3.3.
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
Age Any work Hours of work
Bottom Middle Top Bottom Middle Top
12 0.14 0.11 0.04 4.47 2.21 0.72
(0.35) (0.31) (0.19) (13.15) (8.13) (4.20)
13 0.21 0.11 0.07 7.04 3.39 1.39
(0.41) (0.32) (0.25) (16.95) (12.85) (7.01)
14 0.28 0.14 0.12 10.65 4.32 2.92
(0.45) (0.35) (0.32) (20.27) (13.07) (9.72)
15 0.40 0.24 0.19 12.99 8.54 5.47
(0.49) (0.43) (0.39) (19.09) (18.75) (14.08)
16 0.42 0.32 0.24 17.04 13.71 8.49
(0.50) (0.47) (0.43) (23.70) (23.18) (18.49)
in some working activity. Child labor increases not only on the extensive margin, but also on
the intensive margin: the average number of working hours goes from 3 hours for 12 years old
kids up to 13 hours for 16 years old children. Second, there is a strong monotonic relationship
between household income and child labor, with the difference between the poorest and the richest
households becoming more pronounced as children get older. For example, 41 percent of 15-16
years old children in the “Bottom” group work (with an average of 15 working hours per week)
against only 21 percent of children in the “Top” group (with an average of 7 working hours per
week).
3.4 Child labor regulations and education system
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sixteen who did not finish compulsory school. There are additional restrictions to employment
for 14-15 years old children, including mandatory medical examinations, exclusions from working
in hazardous activities, and a limit of six working hours per day. Statistics in Table 2 seem to
suggest that child labor laws might not be fully enforced, but they appear to limit somehow the
work participation of children younger than 14.
With respect to the Mexican education system, compulsory school, which comprises primary
and secondary education, should end around age 14 although it is not uncommon for children to
delay completion because of grade repetition and late enrollment. After completion of secondary
school, typically children either start high school (preparatoria or bachillerato) or they enter the
where Oi jt is the outcome of interest for child i in village j at time t; Postt is an indicator for
the follow-up survey; Cashi and Kindi are indicators equal to one if child i lives in a household
that received at least one cash or in-kind transfer, respectively; Xit is a vector of individual and
household specific controls; θi represents individual fixed effects. The vector of controls Xit in-
cludes: the age of the child; the total number of household members and the numbers of children
aged 0 to 5, 6 to 11 and 12 to 18 living within the household; a dummy for the presence of an old
member; an indicator for the head of the household being female; the household income index; and
indicators for receiving other governmental programs, including Oportunidades. Standard errors
are clustered at the village level to account for potentially correlated shocks at the locality level.
The program participation variables, Cashi and Kindi, are constructed from self-reported data
on the receipt of transfers and are defined as indicators equal to one if the household received
at least one PAL transfer since the start of the program. Because participation into the program
might be correlated with individual unobservables, Cashi and Kindi are potentially endogenous in
labor force.
Because of the institutional framework, it is expected that the impact of PAL transfers on child
labor might vary with the age of the child. Whereas for 12-14 years old children at baseline there
are legal restrictions to child labor, for children who are 15-16 years old at baseline (and thus 16
to 18 at follow-up) child labor laws are not binding in the follow-up period. For this reason, in the
empirical analysis I estimate the impact of PAL transfers separately on 12-14 years old children at
baseline and 15-16 years old at baseline.
4 Empirical strategy
In order to estimate the effect of the PAL program on child labor, I compare the difference over
time in the labor supply of children in each treatment group vis-a-vis the difference over time in the
labor supply of children in the control group. The empirical specification employs a difference-in-
difference estimation strategy controlling for individual fixed effects. More specifically, I estimate
the following model
Oi jt = α + γPostt +δCashCashi×Postt +δKindKindi×Postt +λ ′Xit +θi+ εi jt , (12)
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the estimating equation.24 To overcome this issue, I use an instrumental variable strategy, which
requires identifying two variables which are correlated with the receipt of the transfer but that
can be excluded from equation (12). Since the assignment of villages into the treatment arms
24As already discussed in Section 3.2, it appears that about 10 percent of respondents did not receive PAL transfers.
This might be due to ineligibility to the program or to imperfect compliance, with households voluntarily dropping out
of the program despite being eligible.
was random, village-level treatment dummies can be used to instrument transfer receipt. In other
words, I define ZCashj and Z
Kind
j to be dummy variables taking the value one if the child lives in a
village randomly assigned to receive cash or in-kind transfers, respectively, and I estimate equation
(12) using a two-stage-least-square within estimator.
The parameters of interest are δCash and δKind , which measure, respectively, the impact of
cash and in-kind transfers on the relevant outcome. More specifically, the instrumental variable
approach identifies the local Average Treatment Effects of providing benefits in-cash or in-kind on
child labor supply and the estimated parameters are interpreted as the effects of the intervention
for the subpopulation of compliers. Identification requires some additional assumptions: (i) the
stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA); (ii) the random assignment; (iii) independence;
(iv) monotonicity; (v) relevance of the instrument.
The first assumption requires that the potential outcome for one unit is not affected by the
assignment to treatment of another unit. As the PAL experiment was implemented at the village
level, a possible violation of the SUTVA could arise if there are village-level spillover effects.
However, these effects are unlikely since experimental localities are not close to each other and, as
discussed in Section 3.2, the only two contiguous villages have been eliminated from the sample.
The second assumption requires that individuals in villages receiving different treatments present
similar characteristics. As we have seen in Table 1, the randomization was overall successful. In
addition, the inclusion of individual fixed effects allows to control for any observed and unobserved
characteristics fixed over time which might be correlated with the child’s time allocation. The
independence assumption requires that the instrument does not directly affect the outcome or the
unobserved component of the participation rule.25As the instrument is the random assignment,
it is unlikely to affect observed outcomes rather than by changing participation in the treatment.
As for the monotonicity assumption, it suggests that children in those villages randomized into
the program are more likely to select into the treatment. Finally, the last assumption requires
the instrument to be sufficiently strong. In Appendix C I discuss the results of the first stage
regressions.
It is also worth emphasizing that, in the presence of general equilibrium effects of cash and in-
kind transfers on local prices, δCash and δKind would capture both the direct effect of the transfer
25The participation rule for cash recipients can be written as follows
Cashi =
{
1 if Cash∗i ≥ 0
0 otherwise
,
where Cash∗i = g(ZCashj ,v
Cash
i ) and v
Cash
i are unobserved variables determining the choice of participating in the
program. The independence assumption requires that (Oi jt ,vCashi ) ⊥ ZCashj . A similar participation rule can of course
be written for the in-kind recipients.
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and the indirect effects of such price changes. It has been shown that the in-kind transfer provided
by the PAL program caused a fall in the residual demand of the subsidized goods which in turn led
26Child labor could adjust in one direction or another depending on whether income or substitution effects prevail
(Soares et al., 2012). On one hand, child labor might increase in order to partially compensate for the reduction in
household earnings from food production. On the other hand, child labor might decrease as a result of the reduction
in the opportunity cost of children’s time.
Hypothesis testing In the model presented in Section 2, the provision of government transfers
would determine: (i) a reduction in the number of hours worked for children at the bottom and
in the middle of the income distribution (i.e., those to the left of εH); (ii) a reduction in work
participation only for children in the middle income group (i.e., those between εL and εH). After
classifying households into income tertiles as described in Section 3.3, I estimate equation (12)
separately for the “Bottom”, “Middle” and “Top” income tertiles. Testing the model predictions
require that: (i) the coefficients δCash and δKind are negative in the hours of work equation for both
the “Bottom” and “Middle” income groups; (ii) the coefficients δCash and δKind are negative in the
work participation equation only for the “Middle” income group. Therefore, in the next section I
also provide the one-sided p-values corresponding to the predicted impact of the transfers.
Finally, another parameter of interest is the differential impact of cash versus in-kind transfer,
δCash−δKind . As discussed in Section 2, if the nominal value of the transfer in-kind was equal to
the value of the cash transfer, then the impact of a transfer in-kind would be bounded above by the
impact of the cash transfer, i.e. δCash ≥ δKind . However, if the nominal value of the transfer in-kind
is larger than the value of the cash transfer, as it is the case for the PAL program, then the impact of
the in-kind transfer can be either larger or smaller than that of the cash transfer depending on the
extent of the extra-marginality of the in-kind subsidy. For this reason, instead of testing a one-sided
hypothesis on δCash − δKind , I only present the p-values from the two sided null hypothesis that
δCash−δKind = 0.
5 Results
Section 5.1 estimates the impact of PAL on different measures of child labor and schooling for
children in different age groups. Section 5.2 tests the predictions of the model presented in Section
2 by studying the heterogeneous impact of PAL on child labor across the income distribution.
Section 5.3 provides evidence against alternative mechanisms that could explain the heterogeneous
impacts of PAL on child labor.
to a reduction in the prices of such commodities (Cunha et al., 2019). Therefore, for households
whose income depend on the production of close substitutes of PAL goods, the fall in the prices
can be interpreted as a demand shock which might in turn affect household decisions about child
labor and schooling.26 Further discussion about these mechanisms are presented in Section 5.3 in
which I look for heterogeneous effects of the transfers on child labor for households involved in
agricultural and non-agricultural activities.
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5.1 Overall results
Table 3 presents the estimated impact of PAL on several measures of children’s time allocation.
The first column considers any type of working activity in the last seven days, whereas the second
and third column consider, respectively, paid and unpaid activities. In the fourth column, child
labor is measured on the intensive margin (hours of work in the last seven days). Finally, the
last column shows results for school attendance. Three samples of children are considered in
the analysis: the full sample of 12-16 years old at baseline (Panel A); 12-14 years old at baseline
(Panel B); and 15-16 years old at baseline (PanelC). As discussed above, the rationale for choosing
these specific age groups has to do with child labor regulations in Mexico, which prohibit work
participation for all children younger than 14 and restricts it for 14-15 years old children. If such
restrictions are binding, we should expect no effect on the work participation of younger kids and
potentially some effect for children who, in the follow-up, are above the legal working age.
This is indeed what results in Table 3 suggest. Whereas PAL does not change the time alloca-
tion of children in the 12-14 years group, the program has large and statistically significant effects
for children in the 15-16 years old group. In particular, children from cash recipient households
reduce their participation in paid activities by 14 percentage points as compared to children in the
control group. On the intensive margin, cash recipients work about 10 hours less, a reduction of
about 50% as compared to the average weekly working hours of children in the control group at
follow-up. Cash recipients are also 12 percentage points more likely to attend school, and about
9 percentage points less likely to work in any type of activity, although this latter estimate is not
statistically different from zero. As for in-kind recipients, all estimates have the expected sign but
are smaller in magnitude and are not statistically different from zero. As a result, when testing
for differential effects of cash versus in-kind transfers on children’s time allocation, I find that the
cash transfer reduces employment in paid activities and hours of work among children in the 15-16
years group by a significantly larger margin than the in-kind transfer (p-values equal to 0.009 and
0.001, respectively; see the second to last row in Panel C).
Overall, the null impacts of the program for children younger than 15 at baseline are coherent
with binding child labor regulations. Instead, older children typically face higher opportunity costs
from not working, and they are therefore more likely to drop out of school without progressing into
high school. In this respect, the schooling of children of legal working age is more likely to satisfy
the luxury axiom as compared to the schooling of younger kids. If households value child welfare
of older children but could not afford to forego their child labor earnings, government transfers
could allow children who would have otherwise entered the labor force to stay a few extra years
The results of the first stage are reported in Appendix C. The instruments are very strongly
correlated with household participation into the program. Indeed, depending on the model, the
Kleibergen-Paap statistic ranges from 241 to 1715, while the Cragg-Donald statistic is always
above 230.
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Table 3: Estimated impact of PAL on child labor and schooling by age groups
in school. Because of these observations, when testing the model’s prediction across the income
distribution I focus on the sample of 15-16 years old children and report the results for younger
children in Appendix C.
Before turning to the analysis by income groups, I investigate the existence of differential
effects for boys and girls. I estimate equation (12) including interaction terms between the transfer
receipt dummies and an indicator for the child being male, and I instrument the transfer receipt
dummies and the interaction terms with the village-level treatment dummies and their interactions
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The dependent variable in columns 1 is an indicator for the child working
in any activity (paid or unpaid) in the last seven days. The dependent variable in columns 2 (3) is an indicator for the
child working in a paid (unpaid) activity in the last seven days. The dependent variable in column 4 is the number of
working hours in the last seven days. Hours of work are equal to zero for children not working in the last seven days.
The dependent variable in column 5 is an indicator for the child currently attending school. Cash×Post denotes an
indicator for receiving the cash treatment in the post-intervention survey; Kind×Post denotes an indicator for receiving
the in-kind treatment in the post-intervention survey. Child controls, household controls and individual fixed effecs
are included. Panel A shows results for the full sample of children. Panel B show results for children aged 12 to 14
at baseline; Panel C for children aged 15 to 16 at baseline. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are
reported in parenthesis.
Panel C. 15-16 years old children
Cash×Post -0.087 -0.145** 0.049 -10.130*** 0.122*
(0.062) (0.058) (0.042) (2.799) (0.065)
Kind×Post -0.029 -0.016 0.004 -1.764 0.040
(0.051) (0.052) (0.032) (2.341) (0.053)
Mean in control group at follow-up 0.467 0.389 0.084 19.543 0.408
H0: Cash×Post=Kind×Post, p-value 0.289 0.009 0.296 0.001 0.118
Observations 1570 1532 1532 1514 1562
Any work Paid work
Unpaid
work
Hours of work
School at-
tendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. All children
Cash×Post -0.014 -0.045 0.032 -1.731 0.016
(0.041) (0.031) (0.036) (1.460) (0.042)
Kind×Post -0.025 -0.009 -0.007 -0.616 0.024
(0.032) (0.028) (0.022) (1.002) (0.031)
Mean in control group at follow-up 0.343 0.255 0.087 11.627 0.610
H0: Cash×Post=Kind×Post, p-value 0.762 0.215 0.227 0.439 0.817
Observations 5018 4942 4942 4916 5010
Panel B. 12-14 years old children
Cash×Post 0.017 -0.003 0.025 1.894 -0.033
(0.051) (0.036) (0.042) (1.869) (0.049)
Kind×Post -0.026 -0.008 -0.011 -0.324 0.019
(0.039) (0.031) (0.025) (1.102) (0.038)
Mean in control group at follow-up 0.294 0.203 0.088 8.601 0.688
H0: Cash×Post=Kind×Post, p-value 0.310 0.893 0.313 0.204 0.172
Observations 3448 3410 3410 3402 3448
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Any work Paid work
Unpaid
work
Hours of
work
School at-
tendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cash×Post -0.127 -0.117 0.020 -8.598** 0.131
(0.088) (0.077) (0.050) (3.481) (0.085)
Kind×Post 0.028 0.044 0.011 -0.218 0.022
(0.073) (0.071) (0.043) (3.230) (0.076)
(Cash×Post)×Male 0.087 -0.050 0.065 -1.859 -0.018
(0.130) (0.125) (0.085) (5.765) (0.110)
(Kind×Post)×Male -0.102 -0.121 -0.003 -3.325 0.042
(0.111) (0.098) (0.071) (5.178) (0.102)
Mean in control group at follow-up 0.467 0.389 0.084 19.543 0.408
H0: Cash×Post=Kind×Post, p-value 0.039 0.018 0.798 0.006 0.133
H0: (Cash×Post)×Male=(Kind×Post)×Male,
p-value
0.074 0.499 0.352 0.770 0.494
Observations 1570 1532 1532 1514 1562
with the male dummy.27 As the main effect of the program is on 15-16 years old children, I
27In other words, I estimate the following model Oi jt = α + γPostt + δCashF Cashi ×Postt + δKindF Kindi ×Postt +
δCashM (Cashi×Postt)×Mi+δKindM (Kindi×Postt)×Mi+λ ′Xit +θi+εi jt ,where Mi is an indicator for child i being male
and Xit includes the same control variables of the original model as well as their interactions with the male dummy.
Using the same notation of Section 4, the full set of instruments is given by
{
ZCashj ,Z
Kind
j ,Z
Cash
j ×Mi,ZKindj ×Mi
}
.
estimate the model on this age group only. The results in Table 4 show that there are no differential
effects of either cash or in-kind transfers on child labor and schooling as the interaction terms
between the receipt of the transfers and the male dummy are not statistically significant.
5.2 Heterogeneity by household income
In order to test the model predictions, households have been classified into three tertiles based on
the value of the baseline income index (see Section 3.3). In what follows, I estimate the regression
model in equation (12) separately for the “Bottom”, “Middle” and “Top” income groups. Mapping
the model predictions to the empirical framework, we would expect households in the bottom
tertile, which are more likely to be below a “subsistence threshold”, to reduce child labor only on
the intensive margin after receiving government transfers. Households in the middle tertile, whose
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes children aged 15-16 at baseline. The dependent
variable in columns 1 is an indicator for the child working in any activity (paid or unpaid) in the last seven days. The
dependent variable in columns 2 (3) is an indicator for the child working in a paid (unpaid) activity in the last seven
days. The dependent variable in column 4 is the number of working hours in the last seven days. Hours of work
are equal to zero for children not working in the last seven days. The dependent variable in column 5 is an indicator
for the child currently attending school. Cash×Post denotes an indicator for receiving the cash treatment in the post-
intervention survey; Kind×Post denotes an indicator for receiving the in-kind treatment in the post-intervention survey;
(Cash×Post)×Male interacts Cash×Post with an indicator for the child being male; (Kind×Post)×Male interacts
Kind×Post with an indicator for the child being male. Child controls, household controls and individual fixed effecs
are included. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are reported in parenthesis.
Table 4: Estimated impact of PAL on child labor and schooling by gender
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 29 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1935
pre-transfer income might guarantee consumption above subsistence but not sufficiently large to
forego child labor earnings entirely, are expected to reduce child labor on both the intensive and
extensive margins. Finally, no change is expected for households in the top income tertile.
Table 5 shows the impact of PAL on the extensive (columns 1 to 3) and intensive margin
(columns 4 to 6) of child labor. Looking first at the program effect for cash recipients, we can
observe that the pattern of response to the transfer across the income distribution is in line with
the model predictions. First, child labor decreased on the extensive margin only for children in the
“Middle” income group. The estimated impact of the cash transfer is very large and statistically
significant at the 5% level: as compared to children of similar socio-economic background that
received no transfer, cash recipients are 23 percentage points less likely to work. Second, both
children in the bottom and in middle income groups experience a reduction on the intensive margin
of about 12 to 14 hours per week when the household receives the PAL cash transfer as compared
to control group children. Despite the estimates for the bottom and middle income group are very
similar in magnitude, there is no significant reduction on the extensive margin for children in the
bottom income group. This result is consistent with the model prediction and, as discussed in
Section 3.3, with the fact that children in this population are not typically employed in occupations
with indivisible working hours. Third, consistently with the model, there is no significant change
on the extensive and intensive margins of child labor for relatively richer households.
As for the transfer in-kind, the estimates suggest a reduction on child labor only for children in
the middle of the income distribution. On the extensive margin, children in in-kind recipient house-
holds are 22 percentage points less likely to work as compared to children in the control group.
On the intensive margin, the estimated impact of PAL amounts to a reduction of approximately 8
hours per week. Both estimates are very similar in magnitude to the estimated impact of the cash
transfer, and in fact the differences are not statistically different from zero (see second to last row
of Table 5). Moreover, as found for the cash transfer, also the in-kind transfer has a null effect on
child labor for households at the top of the income distribution. The main difference between the
two transfer modalities is found for children in the bottom income tertile. The transfer in-kind does
not have any effect on the child labor supply on either the extensive or the intensive margin. On
the contrary, the cash transfer causes a significant reduction in working hours, with the difference
between the estimated impacts of the two transfer modalities being significant at the 1% level.
Taken together, these results suggest that the impact of the cash transfer on child labor is more
homogeneous across the household’s income distribution than that of the transfer in-kind. A plausi-
ble explanation for this difference is related to the regressive nature of the transfer in-kind. Tagliati
(2018) shows that the PAL food basket is more likely to be extra-marginal for households with low
levels of income, and that the willingness to pay for the in-kind subsidy is increasing with house-
hold socioeconomic status. Therefore, welfare gains from the basket might not be large enough for
poor households to forgo the additional earnings that could be generated from child labor.
The results discussed so far show reductions in the work participation of some groups of chil-
dren receiving transfers in-kind or in-cash. Therefore, it is interesting to see if these changes in
work participation are mapped into an increase in the school attendance of treated children. Unfor-
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child is currently attending school. As the survey did not distinguish between school enrollment
and attendance, nor it asked about attendance in a specific time period (e.g., in the last seven days),
the outcome variable is likely to capture both an increase in the enrollment rate (change over the
extensive margin) and an increase in the daily attendance of children (change over the intensive
margin).
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes children aged 15-16 at baseline. The dependent
variable in columns 1 to 3 is an indicator for the child working in the last seven days. The dependent variable in
columns 4 to 6 is the number of working hours in the last seven days. Hours of work are equal to zero for children
not working in the last seven days. Cash×Post denotes an indicator for receiving the cash treatment in the post-
intervention survey; Kind×Post denotes an indicator for receiving the in-kind treatment in the post-intervention survey.
Child controls, household controls and individual fixed effecs are included. "Bottom", "middle" and "top" refer to the
tertiles of the baseline income distribution as proxied by the income index discussed in Section 3.3. Standard errors
are clustered at the village level and are reported in parenthesis.
The analysis presented in Table 6 shows that, for children in the middle of the income distribu-
tion, both the cash and the in-kind transfers have a large effect on school attendance: the estimated
increase in school attendance is 15 percentage points for the cash group and 11 percentage points
for the in-kind group (column 2). Despite the low precision of the estimates, the p-values of the
one-sided t- test confirm that the estimated coefficients are statistically greater than zero. In addi-
tion, consistently with the results found in the work participation analysis, the effect for children
in the lowest income tertile receiving the cash transfer is both statistically larger than zero and
very close in magnitude to the effect observed for children in the “Middle” income group. On
the contrary, again the in-kind transfer does not have any effect on the poorest children. These
results confirm that the impact of the cash transfer is more homogeneous across the income dis-
tribution than the impact of the in-kind transfer. Indeed, the null hypothesis that cash and in-kind
transfers had the same effect on school attendance for children in the bottom tertile is rejected
(p-value=0.079).
Any work Hours of work
Bottom
tertile
Middle
tertile
Top
tertile
Bottom
tertile
Middle
tertile
Top
tertile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash×Post -0.014 -0.233** -0.059 -12.370** -14.064** -5.209
(0.099) (0.105) (0.108) (5.277) (4.353) (6.148)
Kind×Post 0.117 -0.218** 0.010 3.666 -8.212** -1.388
(0.099) (0.093) (0.070) (4.767) (4.148) (5.025)
Mean in control group at follow-up 0.471 0.519 0.404 21.612 19.173 16.889
H0: Cash×Post≤0, p-value 0.444 0.013 0.292 0.010 0.001 0.198
H0: Kind×Post≤0, p-value 0.882 0.009 0.556 0.779 0.024 0.391
H0: Cash×Post=Kind×Post,
p-value
0.129 0.872 0.484 0.001 0.104 0.348
Observations 528 528 514 498 518 498
tunately, the only available information about school participation is an indicator for whether the
Table 5: Estimated impact of PAL on child labor supply by household income
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 31 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1935
Robustness checks Next, I test the robustness of the results presented above in several ways.
First, one might be concerned that the effect of the program on child labor might be at least par-
tially induced by parental participation into the education classes offered by the PAL program.
This might occur if child labor is stigmatized and, as a result of the increased parental interaction
with other individuals in the village when attending the classes, parents changed their child labor
decisions. One ideal framework to test this hypothesis would require having a group of villages
receiving only cash or in-kind transfers, but not the classes. As discussed in Section 3, accord-
ing to the original design of the program some households should have received only the in-kind
transfer without the classes but, due to confounding of the treatment, these were taught also in
those villages that should have received a purely unconditional transfer. Nevertheless, this latter
group of households were significantly less exposed to this component of the program (see Table
B2 in Appendix B). Hence, in order to check how the provision of the classes might have affected
the results, I replicate the analysis presented above but excluding those in-kind villages that were
randomized into the classes. As now the estimates for the in-kind treatment only take into account
the effect on those households that were less exposed to the classes, if these had any effect on child
labor we should observe a reduction of the estimated coefficients for the in-kind treatment group.
School attendance
Bottom tertile Middle tertile Top tertile
(1) (2) (3)
Cash×Post 0.173 0.146 0.087
(0.115) (0.113) (0.105)
Kind×Post 0.017 0.114 0.005
(0.099) (0.088) (0.084)
Mean in control group at follow-up 0.309 0.389 0.574
H0: Cash×Post≥0, p-value 0.065 0.098 0.202
H0: Kind×Post≥0, p-value 0.431 0.098 0.477
H0: Cash×Post=Kind×Post, p-value 0.079 0.733 0.240
Observations 520 526 516
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes children aged 15-16 at baseline. The dependent
variable is an indicator for the child currently attending school. Cash×Post denotes an indicator for receiving the
cash treatment in the post-intervention survey; Kind×Post denotes an indicator for receiving the in-kind treatment in
the post-intervention survey. Child controls, household controls and individual fixed effecs are included. "Bottom",
"middle" and "top" refer to the tertiles of the baseline income distribution as proxied by the income index discussed in
Section 3.3. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are reported in parenthesis.
Table 6: Estimated impact of PAL on school attendance by household income
The results in Table 7 show that the estimates change very little as compared to those presented
in Table 5. While the estimates for the number of working hours are essentially the same, those for
the work participation model show, if anything, a larger impact of the in-kind transfer. Overall the
results in Table 7 do not support the hypothesis that the impact of the PAL program on child labor
might be due to the attendance of the classes rather than to the provision of the transfers.
Second, another potential concern is the fact that some households were receiving transfers
from the conditional cash transfer program Oportunidades. While one of the eligibility rules re-
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 32 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1935
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes children aged 15-16 at baseline in villages receiving
either: (i) cash transfer; (ii) in-kind transfers without the classes; (iii) no transfer. The dependent variable in columns 1
to 3 is an indicator for the child working in the last seven days. The dependent variable in columns 4 to 6 is the number
of working hours in the last seven days. Hours of work are equal to zero for children not working in the last seven days.
Cash×Post denotes an indicator for receiving the cash treatment in the post-intervention survey; Kind×Post denotes
an indicator for receiving the in-kind treatment in the post-intervention survey. Child controls, household controls
and individual fixed effecs are included. "Bottom", "middle" and "top" refer to the tertiles of the baseline income
distribution as proxied by the income index discussed in Section 3.3. Standard errors are clustered at the village level
and are reported in parenthesis.
Any work Hours of work
Bottom
tertile
Middle
tertile
Top
tertile
Bottom
tertile
Middle
tertile
Top
tertile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash×Post 0.015 -0.178 -0.061 -10.510* -13.394** -6.320
(0.107) (0.111) (0.111) (5.545) (4.640) (6.432)
Kind×Post 0.113 -0.209** 0.015 5.032 -8.871** -1.885
(0.106) (0.101) (0.076) (4.878) (4.400) (5.262)
Mean in control group at follow-up 0.500 0.489 0.419 23.375 18.556 17.927
H0: Cash×Post≤0, p-value 0.555 0.055 0.292 0.029 0.002 0.163
H0: Kind×Post≤0, p-value 0.856 0.019 0.580 0.849 0.022 0.360
H0: Cash×Post=Kind×Post,
p-value
0.289 0.732 0.456 0.001 0.215 0.295
Observations 470 492 484 446 480 470
Table 7: Estimated impact of PAL on child labor supply by household income, robustness check
excluding in-kind villages randomized into the classes
Any work Hours of work
Bottom
tertile
Middle
tertile
Top
tertile
Bottom
tertile
Middle
tertile
Top
tertile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash×Post 0.003 -0.232** -0.055 -11.008** -14.217** -5.305
(0.099) (0.107) (0.105) (5.175) (4.580) (5.956)
Kind×Post 0.071 -0.231** -0.009 4.118 -7.575* -1.879
(0.127) (0.101) (0.078) (6.339) (4.580) (5.114)
Mean in control group at follow-up 0.464 0.528 0.404 21.294 19.549 16.889
H0: Cash×Post≤0, p-value 0.510 0.015 0.299 0.017 0.001 0.187
H0: Kind×Post≤0, p-value 0.713 0.011 0.452 0.742 0.049 0.357
H0: Cash×Post=Kind×Post,
p-value
0.551 0.996 0.654 0.015 0.078 0.394
Observations 402 396 386 384 386 376
Table 8: Estimated impact of PAL on child labor supply by household income, robustness check
excluding households receiving Oportunidades
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes children aged 15-16 at baseline who do not receive
Oportunidades. The dependent variable in columns 1 to 3 is an indicator for the child working in the last seven days.
The dependent variable in columns 4 to 6 is the number of working hours in the last seven days. Hours of work
are equal to zero for children not working in the last seven days. Cash×Post denotes an indicator for receiving the
cash treatment in the post-intervention survey; Kind×Post denotes an indicator for receiving the in-kind treatment in
the post-intervention survey. Child controls, household controls and individual fixed effecs are included. "Bottom",
"middle" and "top" refer to the tertiles of the baseline income distribution as proxied by the income index discussed in
Section 3.3. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are reported in parenthesis.
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quired households not to be part of other major welfare programs, around 12 percent of households
were receiving transfers from Oportunidades. As the Oportunidades program provides cash trans-
fers conditional on child participation into school, if there are systematic differences between treat-
ment and control villages in the proportions of households receiving scholarships, the estimates for
child labor might be capturing the effect of Oportunidades rather than the effect of PAL. To check
the robustness of the results, in Table 8 I present the estimated impact of the PAL program after
excluding households receiving scholarships from Oportunidades. As the estimates are similar to
those in Table 5, we can conclude that the observed changes in the work participation of children
are not driven by the provision of other welfare programs.
The results are also robust to correction for multiple hypothesis testing (Romano and Wolf,
2005; Romano and Wolf, 2016), which is presented in Table D1 of Appendix D. Moreover, when
estimating equation (12) using hours of work as the dependent variable, estimation bias might
occur as a result of censoring at zero. Table D2 in Appendix D shows that results are robust when
using a Tobit model with individual fixed effects (Honoré, 1992).
5.3 Alternative mechanisms
Throughout the paper, the proposed interpretation for the observed impact of cash and in-kind
transfers on child labor across the income distribution is given by household preferences for child
welfare being characterized by a luxury axiom. In this section, I investigate alternative mechanisms
that could generate similar patterns and provide evidence against such mechanisms.
One possibility is that cash and in-kind transfers affect differently households working in the
agricultural or in the non-agricultural sector. On one hand, both transfers can have general equilib-
rium effects on local food prices. In an influential paper, Cunha et al. (2019) found that there was
a significant reduction in the prices of the subsidized commodities in those villages receiving the
PAL food basket. This could in turn affect the local demand for child labor. For example, produc-
ers of substitutes of the transferred goods might incur lower profits from the government provision
of the in-kind transfer and, as a result, they might try to compensate the profit loss with increased
earnings from child labor. On the other hand, cash or in-kind transfers might also free resources
which are used to buy productive assets which are substitutes for child labor in the production
of food. If the probability of being engaged in food production differs across the distribution of
household income, then the underlying mechanism for the heterogeneous changes in the child labor
decisions might be driven by the heterogeneity of the welfare effects of PAL transfers for producer
versus non-producer households rather than by preferences for child welfare.
As food production is not directly observed, I investigate this possibility by estimating equation
(12) with interaction terms between the receipt of PAL transfers and an indicator for the household
being engaged in agricultural activities at baseline (Agric). The set of instruments include the
village treatment dummies and their interactions with the agricultural activity dummy. Following
Cunha et al. (2019), I define the variable Agric to take the value one if either: (i) at least one
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household member was employed in agricultural occupations in the last year at baseline; or (ii) the
household consumed some food from their own production. The results of the estimation of this
extended model are reported in Table 9. As can be seen, the interaction terms are not statistically
significant. This suggests that the PAL cash and in-kind transfers did not have differential effects on
schooling and on the extensive and intensive margins of child labor for households which worked
in the agricultural sector at baseline versus those that did not.
Another possibility is that child labor is complementary or substitute with adult labor. In such
a case, the observed changes in the work participation of 15-16 years old children would be driven
by the effects of PAL transfers on adult labor supply. The results reported in Skoufias et al. (2008)
do not support the existence of adjustments in the labor supply of adults on average, but there might
exist heterogeneous effects across the income distribution. For such a mechanism to be the driver
behind the results in Section 5.2 we would expect that, across tertiles of the income distribution,
the estimated impact of PAL transfers on adult labor supply has the same (opposite) sign than the
estimates in Table 5 if child labor is complimentary (substitute) with adult labor.
In order to shed light on this mechanism, I estimate equation (12) for the work participation and
working hours in the last seven days of the adult population for each tertile of household income.
To be consistent with the results shown in Section 5.2, I focus on working age (i.e., 25-65 years old)
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes children aged 15-16 at baseline. The dependent
variable in columns 1 is an indicator for the child working in the week prior to the survey. The dependent variable
in columns 2 are working hours in the last seven days. Hours of work are equal to zero for children not working
in the last seven days. The dependent variable in column 3 is an indicator for the child currently attending school.
Cash×Post denotes an indicator for receiving the cash treatment in the post-intervention survey; Kind×Post denotes an
indicator for receiving the in-kind treatment in the post-intervention survey; (Cash×Post)×Agric interacts Cash×Post
with an indicator for the household working in agricultural activities; (Kind×Post)×Agric interacts Kind×Post with
an indicator for the household working in agricultural activities. Child controls, household controls and individual
fixed effecs are included. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are reported in parenthesis.
Table 9: Estimated impact of PAL on child labor and schooling by baseline sector of activity of the
household
Any work Hours of work
School
attendance
(1) (2) (3)
Cash×Post -0.138 -10.353 0.115
(0.147) (6.832) (0.141)
Kind×Post -0.023 0.255 0.060
(0.097) (4.834) (0.090)
(Cash×Post)×Agric 0.070 0.303 0.012
(0.170) (8.190) (0.157)
(Kind×Post)×Agric 0.003 -2.272 -0.020
(0.126) (6.468) (0.111)
Mean in control group at follow-up 0.467 19.543 0.408
H0: Cash×Post=Kind×Post, p-value 0.402 0.103 0.693
H0: (Cash×Post)×Agric=(Kind×Post)×Agric
p-value
0.663 0.716 0.832
Observations 1570 1514 1562
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individuals within households with at least one child aged 15-16 at baseline. In Table 10, I report
separately the results for female (Panel A) and male (Panel B) members of the household as child
Panel B. Male adults
Cash×Post 0.021 0.034 0.103 4.472 2.120 2.926
(0.060) (0.063) (0.070) (5.239) (5.368) (6.132)
Kind×Post 0.033 0.089 0.061 1.465 4.032 4.051
(0.067) (0.059) (0.066) (4.347) (4.745) (5.433)
Mean in control group at follow-up 0.930 0.955 0.900 38.902 41.548 44.225
H0: Cash×Post=Kind×Post,
p-value
0.847 0.374 0.402 0.516 0.668 0.824
Observations 426 424 432 386 396 410
Table 10: Estimated impact of PAL on adult labor supply by household income tertiles
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes working age adults (25-65 years old at baseline)
within households with at least one child aged 15-16 at baseline. Panel A reports results for female adults, Panel B for
male adults. The dependent variable in columns 1 to 3 is an indicator for the individual working in the week prior to
the survey. The dependent variable in columns 4 to 6 is the number of working hours in the week prior to the survey.
Hours of work are equal to zero for individuals not working in the last seven days. (Cash)×Post denotes an indicator
for receiving the cash treatment in the post-intervention survey; Kind×Post denotes an indicator for receiving the
in-kind treatment in the post-intervention survey. Individual controls, household controls and individual fixed effecs
are included. Bottom, middle and top tertiles refer to the baseline income distribution as proxied by the income score
discussed in Section 3.3. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are reported in parenthesis.
labor could be complimentary or substitute with either one or another.28 As can been, the cash
and the in-kind transfer did not affect the labor supply of adults on neither the extensive (columns
1-3) nor the intensive margin (columns 4-6). The estimated impacts are small, never statistically
different from zero and appear to be rather uniform across the distribution of household income.
Therefore, there is no evidence that the estimated effect of the program on child labor could be
explained by complementary or substitutability of child labor with adult labor.
28The estimation results obtained by pooling together male and female adult members do not differ from the dis-
aggregated ones. Also, results do not change when restricting the sample of adult household members only to the
household head and the spouse.
Any work Hours of work
Bottom
tertile
Middle
tertile
Top
tertile
Bottom
tertile
Middle
tertile
Top
tertile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Female adults
Cash×Post 0.087 0.033 0.092 -0.425 4.188 1.799
(0.090) (0.104) (0.118) (2.561) (3.775) (5.819)
Kind×Post 0.068 -0.121 0.059 -0.133 -1.148 5.162
(0.079) (0.095) (0.088) (2.735) (3.600) (5.125)
Mean in control group at follow-up 0.234 0.400 0.250 10.453 12.950 7.314
H0: Cash×Post=Kind×Post,
p-value
0.822 0.065 0.739 0.902 0.065 0.340
Observations 510 528 534 504 526 526
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6 Conclusions
This paper studies child labor and schooling responses to cash and in-kind transfers. In order to
understand if the effectiveness of poverty alleviation programs in contrasting child labor depends
on the transfer modality, I exploit the experimental design of PAL, an unconditional transfer pro-
gram which randomly provided either a food basket or cash to poor households in rural Mexico.
The empirical results show that the cash transfer caused statistically larger reductions in child labor
than the in-kind transfer among children of high school age. Whereas the estimated impact of the
in-kind transfer is not statistically different from zero, cash recipients experienced a reduction of
about 10 working hours a week as compared to children who did not receive benefits from PAL.
A strong focus of the paper is the heterogeneity of the program impact across the distribution
of household income. Both the in-kind and the cash transfer reduced the work participation of
children in the middle tertile of the income distribution by an estimated 22 percentage points as
compared to non-recipients of similar socioeconomic status. None of the transfers affected child
labor on the extensive margin for children in the bottom tertile. However, for this income group
large reductions on the intensive margin are found for cash recipients but not for in-kind recipients.
The differential effect of the two transfer schemes for very poor households can be explained by
the regressivity of the PAL in-kind transfer (Tagliati, 2018). Moreover, the different margins of
adjustment of child labor across the income distribution can be rationalized by a simple theoretical
model in which household preferences for schooling are characterized by a luxury axiom (Basu
and Van, 1998). In such a case, households whose initial income is below subsistence reduce child
labor only on the intensive margin when receiving government transfers, while households above
subsistence respond by decreasing child labor on both the intensive and extensive margins.
These results have important implications for policy analysis. First, both cash and in-kind trans-
fers can be effective means to reduce child labor. However, cash transfers seem to be associated
with larger and more evenly distributed reductions in child labor. The extent to which a transfer in-
kind might reach the same objective as a cash transfer crucially depends on the extra-marginality
of the transfer and on the distribution of the welfare gains across the income distribution. Sec-
ond, the PAL program affected child time allocation exclusively among children above the legal
working age, for which the opportunity cost of schooling is higher. If policy makers are inter-
ested in increasing enrollment into non-compulsory education, transfer programs targeted to poor
households with children above the legal working age might have potentially large effects. Finally,
the results in the paper are consistent with preferences for child welfare being characterized by a
luxury axiom. In such a case, transfer programs whose size is sufficiently large to move household
consumption from below to above subsistence might effectively reduce child labor even though the
size of the transfer does not compensate entirely for the foregone child labor earnings.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 37 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1935
References
[1] Ardington, C., Case, A. and V. Hosegood (2009). Labor supply responses to large
social transfers: longitudinal evidence from South Africa, American Economic Jour-
nal: Applied Economics 1, 22-48.
[2] Avitabile, C. (2012). Does information improve the health behavior of adults targeted
by a conditional transfer program?”, Journal of Human Resources 47, 785-825.
[3] Baird, S., McIntosh, C. and B. Özler (2011). Cash or condition? Evidence from a
cash transfer experiment, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126, 1709-1753.
[4] Baland, J.-M. and J. A. Robinson (2000). Is child labor inefficient?, Journal of Po-
litical Economy 108, 663-679.
[5] Basu, K. and P. H. Van (1998). The economics of child labor, American Economic
Review 88, 412-427.
[6] Blackorby, C. and D. Donaldson, (1988). Cash versus kind, self-selection, and effi-
cient transfers, The American Economic Review 78, 691-700.
[7] de Brauw, A. and J. Hoddinott (2011). Must conditional cash transfer programs be
conditioned to be effective? The impact of conditioning transfers on school enroll-
ment in Mexico, Journal of Development Economics 96, 359-370.
[8] de Carvalho Filho, I.E. (2008). Old-age benefits and retirement decisions of rural
elderly in Brazil, Journal of Development Economics 86, 129-146.
[9] Cunha, J., (2014). Testing paternalism: cash versus in-kind transfers, American Eco-
nomic Journal: Applied Economics 6, 195-230.
[10] Cunha, J., De Giorgi, G. and S. Jayachandran, (2019). The price effects of cash
versus in-kind transfers, Review of Economic Studies 86, 282-312.
[11] Currie, J. and F. Gahvari, (2008). Transfers in cash and in kind: theory meets the
data, Journal of Economic Literature 46, 333-83.
[12] Edmonds, E. (2005). Does child labor decline with improving economic status?,
Journal of Human Resources 40, 77-99.
[13] Edmonds, E. (2006). Child labor and schooling responses to anticipated income in
South Africa, Journal of Development Economics 81, 386-414.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 38 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1935
[14] Edmonds, E. and N. Schady (2012). Poverty alleviation and child labor, American
Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4, 100-124
[15] Edmonds, E. and M. Shrestha (2015). You get what you pay for: schooling incentives
and child labor, Journal of Development Economics 111, 196-211.
[16] Filmer, D. and L. H. Pritchett (2001). Estimating wealth effects without expenditure
data—or tears: an application to educational enrollments in states of India, Demog-
raphy 38, 115-132.
[17] Fiszbein, A. and N. Schady (2009). Conditional cash transfers : reducing present and
future poverty, World Bank Publications Series No. 2597.
[18] Fraker, T. and R. Moffitt (1988). The effect of food stamps on labor supply, Journal
of Public Economics 35, 25-56.
[19] Gahvari, F. (1994). In-kind transfers, cash grants and labor supply, Journal of Public
Economics 55, 495-504.
[20] Garfinkel, I., (1973). Is in-kind redistribution efficient?, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 87, 320–30.
[21] Hagstrom, P. A. (1996). The food stamp participation and labor supply of married
couples: an empirical analysis of joint decisions, Journal of Human Resources 31,
383-403.
[22] Haushofer, J. and J. Shapiro (2016). The short-term impact of unconditional cash
transfers to the poor: experimental evidence from Kenya, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 131, 1973-2042.
[23] Honorati, M., Gentilini, U. and R. G. Yemtsov, (2015). The state of social safety nets
2015, Washington, D.C., World Bank Group.
[24] Honoré, B. E. (1992). Trimmed lad and least squares estimation of truncated and
censored regression models with fixed effects, Econometrica 60, 533-565.
[25] Hoynes, H. W. and D. W. Schanzenbach (2012). Work incentives and the Food Stamp
Program, Journal of Public Economics 96, 151-162.
[26] International Labor Organization (2017). Global estimates of child labor: results and
trends 2012-2016, International Labor Organization.
[27] Jones, D. and I. Marinescu (2018). The Labor Market Impacts of Universal and Per-
manent Cash Transfers: Evidence from the Alaska Permanent Fund, NBER Working
Paper No. 24312.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 39 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1935
[28] Kruger, D. I. (2007). Coffee production effects on child labor and schooling in rural
Brazil, Journal of Development Economics 82, 448-463.
[29] Leonesio, M. V. (1988). In-kind transfers and work incentives, Journal Labor Eco-
nomics 6, 515-529.
[30] Munro, A. (1989). In-kind transfers, cash grants and the supply of labor, European
Economic Review 33, 1597-1604.
[31] Murray, M. P. (1980). A reinterpretation of the traditional income-leisure model,
with application to in-kind subsidy programs, Journal of Public Economics 14, 69-
81.
[32] Nichols, A. L. and R. J. Zeckhauser, (1982). Targeting transfers through restrictions
on recipients, American Economic Review 72(2), 372-77.
[33] Parker, S. (1999). Explaining differences to returns in education in 39 Mexican cities.
Unpublished, PROGRESA, Mexico City.
[34] Ranjan, P. (2001). Credit constraints and the phenomenon of child labor, Journal of
Development Economics 64, 81-102.
[35] Ravallion, M. and Q. Wodon (2000). Does child labor displace schooling? Evi-
dence on behavioural responses to an enrollment subsidy, The Economic Journal
110, C158-75.
[36] Romano, J. P. and M. Wolf (2005). Stepwise multiple testing as formalized data
snooping, Econometrica 73, 1237-1282.
[37] Romano, J. P. and M. Wolf (2016). Efficient computation of adjusted p-values for
resampling-based stepdown multiple testing, Statistics and Probability Letters 113,
38-40.
[38] Sahn, D. E. and H. Alderman (1996). The effect of food subsidies on labor supply in
Sri Lanka, Economic Development and Cultural Change 45, 125-145.
36[39] Salehi-Isfahani, D. and M.H. Mostafavi-Dehzooei (2018). Cash transfers and labor
supply: Evidence from a large-scale program in Iran, Journal of Development Eco-
nomics 135, 349-367.
[40] Schady, N. R. (2004). Do macroeconomic crises always slow human capital accu-
mulation?, The World Bank Economic Review 18, 131-154.
[41] Schultz, T. P. (2004). School subsidies for the poor: evaluating the Mexican Progresa
poverty program, Journal of Development Economics 74, 199-250.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 40 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1935
[42] Skoufias, E., Unar, M. and T. Gonzalez-Cossio (2008). The impacts of cash and in-
kind transfers on consumption and labor supply: experimental evidence from rural
Mexico, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series 4778.
[43] Soares, R., Kruger, D. and M. Berthelon (2012). Household choices of child labor
and schooling: a simple model with application to Brazil, Journal of Human Re-
sources 47, 1-31
[44] Tagliati, F. (2018). Welfare effects of an in-kind transfer program: evidence from
Mexico, Working Papers 1850, Banco de España.
[45] Ventura-Alfaro, C. E., Gutiérrez-Reyes, J. P., Bertozzi-Kenefick, S.M. and N.
Caldés-Gómez, (2011). Análisis de costo-eficiencia del programa de apoyo alimen-
tario en México, Revista de Salud Pública 13, 373-385.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 41 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1935
max
c,z,s
[cσ + zσ ]
γ
σ +αs s.t
pcc+ pzz ≤ w(T − s)+ y¯+ ε.
To simplify the analysis, it is convenient to exploit separability between s and other goods and
solve the maximization problem into two steps. In the first step, I maximize the household’s utility
over c and z, taking the choice of s as given. Let m ≡ w(T − s)+ y¯+ ε for a given choice of s. The
Lagrangian function can be written in the following way
L(c,z,λ ) = [cσ + zσ ]
γ
σ +λ (m− pcc− pzz)
where λ denotes the Lagrangian multiplier. Taking the first order conditions with respect to c
and z gives
γ
σ
[cσ + zσ ]
γ
σ −1 σcσ−1 = λ pc (A1)
γ
σ
[cσ + zσ ]
γ
σ −1 σzσ−1 = λ pz. (A2)
Plugging (A1) into (A2) we get c =
(
pc
pz
) 1
σ−1
z. Defining θ ≡
(
pc
pz
) 1
σ−1 and using the budget
constraint m = pcc+ pzz we obtain
z(m) =
m
pcθ + pz
, (A3)
c(m) =
θm
pcθ + pz
. (A4)
In the second step, we plug (A3) and (A4) into the household’s utility and maximize the fol-
lowing problem over s and m
max
s,m
[(
θm
pcθ + pz
)σ
+
(
m
pcθ + pz
)σ] γσ
+αs s.t
m = w(T − s)+ y¯+ ε.
Appendix (for online publication)
Appendix A: Theoretical results
Model solution
In this appendix I present the solution of the model described in Section 2. The household problem
is given by
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Defining π ≡
(
θσ+1
(pcθ+pz)σ
) γ
σ , the Lagrangian for this problem can be written as
L(s,m,μ) = πmγ +αs+μ [w(T − s)+ y¯+ ε −m] ,
where μ denotes the Lagrangian multiplier. Taking the first order conditions with respect to m
and s gives
πγmγ−1 = μ (A5)
α
>
=
<
μw (A6)
Plugging (A5) into (A6) we get α <=
>
πγmγ−1w. Below I consider these three cases separately.
Case 1: α < πγmγ−1w Under this inequality, the marginal utility of schooling is lower than
the marginal cost of foregone child labor earnings. Hence we have h = T , s = 0 and the budget
constraint is given by m = wT + y¯+ ε . Plugging m into the inequality gives
ε <
(
α
πγ
1
w
) 1
γ−1
−wT − y¯ ≡ εL.
Case 2: α > πγmγ−1w Under this inequality, the marginal utility of schooling is higher than the
marginal cost of foregone child labor earnings. Hence h = 0, s = T and the budget constraint is
given by m = y¯+ ε . Plugging m into the inequality we have
ε >
(
α
πγ
1
w
) 1
γ−1
− y¯ ≡ εH .
Case 3: α = πγmγ−1w This case is characterized by h > 0 and s > 0. The budget constraint
is given by m = wh+ y¯+ ε , so that we can find h = 1w
[(
α
πγ
1
w
) 1
γ−1 − y¯− ε
]
or, alternatively, ε =(
α
πγ
1
w
) 1
γ−1 −wh− y¯. Since 0 ≤ h ≤ T , we have a range of values of ε such that the child works
and goes to school. In particular, h > 0 and s > 0 for
εL =
(
α
πγ
1
w
) 1
γ−1
−wT − y¯ ≤ ε ≤
(
α
πγ
1
w
) 1
γ−1
− y¯ = εH .
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Given 0 < γ ≤ 1, it must be that ∂π∂ pz < 0.
Appendix B: PAL program and additional data analysis
Food basket
The list of goods and the quantities contained in the PAL box are reported in Table B1. To get a
sense of the extent of the extra-marginality of the in-kind transfer, the second column of the table
reports, for each commodity, the percentage of cash recipient households that consumed less than
the subsidized quantity in the follow-up period.1 As one can see, the basket combines commodi-
ties widely consumed by Mexican households (rice, beans, vegetable oil) and others which are
consumed infrequently (pasta soup, cookies) or very rarely (breakfast cereals, corn flour, lentils,
canned fish, powdered milk). The last two columns of Table B1 report the mean and standard
deviation of the value of each commodity in the food basket. Summing across all items, the aver-
π =
[
θσ +1
(pcθ + pz)σ
] γ
σ
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
(
pc
pz
) σ
σ−1
+1(
pc
(
pc
pz
) 1
σ−1
+ pz
)σ
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
γ
σ
=
[
p
σ
σ−1
c + p
σ
σ−1
z
] γ(1−σ)
σ
.
To study whether a change in pz determines a positive or negative shift in εL, I differentiate εL
partially with respect to pz , that is
∂εL
∂ pz
=
[
α
γ
1
w
] 1
γ−1 π
γ
1−γ
(1− γ)
∂π
∂ pz
. (A7)
Given that α > 0, 0 < γ ≤ 1 and σ < 1, it is immediate that π ≥ 0 and that the right hand side
of (A7) has the same sign of ∂π∂ pz . Hence, differentiating π partially with respect to pz gives
∂π
∂ pz
=
γ (1−σ)
σ
[
p
σ
σ−1
c + p
σ
σ−1
z
] γ(1−σ)
σ −1 σ
σ −1 p
1
σ−1
z
=−γ
[
p
σ
σ−1
c + p
σ
σ−1
z
] γ(1−σ)
σ −1
p
1
σ−1
z < 0
Effects of a transfer in-kind
Next, I show how the threshold εL changes when the price of good z changes. The analysis for the
threshold εH is identical. First, remember that the threshold is defined as εL ≡
(
α
πγ
1
w
) 1
γ−1 −wT − y¯,
where π is a function of prices and model parameters given by
1As discussed in Section 2.1, the extra-marginality of an in-kind transfer is determined by looking at the counter-
factual consumption of the subsidized goods under an equal-value cash transfer. Although the PAL cash transfer was
less than an equal-value cash transfer, looking at consumption of cash recipients is more informative than pre-program
consumption or post-program consumption of the control group.
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age value of the in-kind transfer (approximately 205 pesos, or US$ 18) is larger than the value of
the cash transfer (150 pesos, or US$13). The variability in the value of the PAL box reflects the
variation in the prices of PAL commodities across villages.
Commodity Amount of the
transfer (kg)
Percentage of cash
recipients with
consumption lower
than the amount of
the transfer
Baseline average
value of the
transfer (pesos)
Baseline SD of the
value of the
transfer (pesos)
Beans 2 0.08 20.85 3.64
Vegetable oil 1 (lt) 0.09 10.47 0.93
Rice 2 0.26 13.03 4.50
Pasta soup 1.2 0.55 16.23 2.21
Cookies 1 0.55 18.72 5.03
Canned fish 0.6 0.77 16.31 6.04
Corn flour 3 0.80 15.95 8.03
Lentils 1 0.87 10.80 6.20
Breakfast cereals 0.2 0.89 7.37 3.26
Powdered milk 1.92 0.90 75.45 60.25
Total 205.2 64.03
Table B1: PAL food commodities
Notes: The table is taken from Tagliati (2018). Calculations in column 2 are based on self-reported post-program
consumption for households in the cash treatment group. Calculations in columns 3 and 4 use the pre-program median
unit value in a village and are based on 197 sample villages.
Program take-up and contamination of the conditionality requirement
In this section, I document the take-up of the program and the extent of contamination of the condi-
tionality requirement using self-reported data on the receipt of the transfers.2 All households were
2The analysis in this section replicates a similar analysis of the take-up and contamination of the PAL program
which appears in Appendix A of Cunha (2014).
3One additional category refers to classes about the organization of the PAL program. However, since attendance
to this type of classes was a mandatory requirements for all experimental villages, irrespective of whether they were
randomized-in or out of the education component, I exclude them from the computation of class attendance.
asked if they received any transfer from the PAL program, the periodicity of the delivery and the
number of benefits they received. Moreover, conditional on having received at least one transfer,
households were asked about their attendance to classes, the total number of classes attended and
the topics covered among four possibilities: health, nutrition, hygiene, other topics.3
The first column of Table B2 shows that the percentage of households receiving at least one
transfer was very high for all the three treatment types (i.e. cash plus classes - denoted with CC;
in-kind plus classes - denoted with KC; and in-kind without classes - denoted with K). However, as
reported in the bottom rows of the table, program take-up was significantly higher for the in-kind
plus classes sample than for the cash sample. Take-up among households receiving the cash treat-
ment is around 88%, while it is above 92% for households in in-kind villages. In-kind recipients
also received more transfers, although the difference with respect to cash recipients is not statis-
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Notes: Data are from the household survey and are self-reported. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are
clustered at the village level.
4The variability in the number of transfers received is due to the different timing of implementation of the program,
with the program reaching full coverage of eligible villages within a year.
3 reports the percentage of households attending at least one class. Column 4 shows the average
number of classes attended. A few comments are in order. First, 71% of households in the “in-
kind without classes” group attended at least one session, suggesting that the treatment was indeed
confounded. While this percentage is significantly higher for households in the “in-kind plus
classes” group (around 85%), it is not significantly different from that of cash recipients, despite
the fact that for the latter group class attendance was a mandatory requirement of the program.
Second, the program rules envisaged compulsory attendance to monthly classes. However, the
average number of sessions attended was very low, being around four in all treatment groups.
Attrition
This section shows some descriptive statistics about attrition in the sample. Table B3 shows the
attrition rates at the household and at the individual level by treatment group. While household
attrition was around 15 percent in the control group, it was significantly lower for households in
the cash and in-kind treatment groups, and approximately equal to 10 percent. Attrition at the
child level is about 23 percent in the control and in the cash treatment arms, and about 19 percent
in the in-kind treatment arm. There are no statistically significant differences in the attrition rates
of the cash versus in-kind treatment groups (as reported at the bottom of Table B3, where I test for
differential attrition between one treatment group and another).
The fact that the average number of benefits received was significantly higher than the number of
classes attended suggests that, in practice, the conditionality requirement was not enforced.
The next columns show the extent of contamination of the conditionality requirement. Column
tically different from zero. On average, households in the in-kind treatment arm received thirteen
transfers since the start of the program, while households in the cash treatment arm received on
average twelve (see column 2).4
Table B2: Program take-up and contamination
At least one
transfer
Number of
transfers
At least one class Number of
classes
Cash+Classes (CC) 0.881 12.329 0.720 4.444
(0.023) (0.586) (0.057) (0.524)
Kind+Classes (KC) 0.937 13.388 0.852 4.865
(0.016) (0.444) (0.028) (0.371)
Kind (K) 0.919 13.115 0.712 4.225
(0.028) (0.318) (0.046) (0.524)
H0: CC = KC, p-value 0.045 0.152 0.039 0.512
H0: CC = K, p-value 0.293 0.241 0.914 0.768
H0: KC = K, p-value 0.589 0.618 0.010 0.320
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Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The table shows attrition rates at the household (column 1), at the
individual (column 2) and at the child level (column 3) by treatment group. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
and are clustered at the village level.
Appendix C: Additional results
First stage regressions
Table C1 shows the first stage regressions for the model estimated in Table 3. The estimation sam-
ple in Table 3 slightly varies depending on the missing values for the chosen dependent variable.
Therefore, I report only the first stage corresponding to the model in column (1) of Table 3, in
which the dependent variable is an indicator for the child working in the last seven days. Table C1
presents the first stage for the full sample of children (columns 1-2), the sample of 12-14 years old
at baseline (columns 3-4), and 15-16 years old at baseline (columns 5-6).
Table C2 shows the first stage for the model estimated in Table 5. As before, I report only the
results for the model in which the dependent variable is an indicator for the child working in the
last seven days, corresponding to the model estimated in columns (1) to (3) in Table 5.
Households Full sample Children 12-16 years
old
Cash -0.039** -0.029 -0.013
(0.019) (0.018) (0.027)
Kind -0.045** -0.043** -0.045*
(0.018) (0.016) (0.025)
Control 0.146*** 0.199*** 0.230***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.020)
H0: Cash=Kind, p value 0.669 0.348 0.191
Observations 6625 30362 3683
Table B3: Attrition rates by treatment group
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All children 12-14 years old children 15-16 years old children
Received
Cash
Received
Kind
Received
Cash
Received
Kind
Received
Cash
Received
Kind
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrument: Cash Village×Post 0.884*** -0.001 0.871*** -0.001 0.911*** -0.003
(0.023) (0.003) (0.025) (0.002) (0.033) (0.004)
Instrument: Kind Village×Post -0.001 0.926*** -0.002 0.931*** -0.000 0.917***
(0.002) (0.018) (0.002) (0.018) (0.003) (0.021)
Post 0.008 0.018 0.016 0.013 -0.011 0.030
(0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.023)
Income Index 0.008** -0.004 0.008** -0.003 0.009 -0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Age -0.004 -0.009 -0.009 -0.006 0.008 -0.017
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
Number of household members 0.011 -0.005 0.016** -0.006 -0.001 -0.003
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009)
Number of 0-5 children -0.009 0.011 -0.018* 0.017 0.010 -0.003
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) (0.014)
Number of 6-11 children -0.010 0.013 -0.018** 0.017* 0.010 0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.019) (0.015)
Number of 12-17 children -0.011** 0.003 -0.015** 0.006 0.003 -0.006
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011)
Old member in the household -0.017 0.034** -0.018 0.032** -0.013 0.031
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.021) (0.034)
Head female 0.015 0.015 0.018 0.020 0.010 0.006
(0.019) (0.013) (0.027) (0.016) (0.009) (0.030)
Received Oportunidades -0.015 -0.045** -0.012 -0.038** -0.022 -0.059
(0.018) (0.022) (0.019) (0.019) (0.035) (0.041)
Received Liconsa -0.018* 0.013 -0.018 0.001 -0.020 0.039
(0.010) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.031)
Received other welfare program 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.014
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011)
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 2993.7 2048.5 899.0
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 1714.8 1360.6 1182.1
Joint F statistic for the instruments 726.6 1420.6 645.2 1414.3 427.8 1063.7
Observations 5018 5018 3448 3448 1570 1570
Table C1: First stage regressions by age groups
Notes: ***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1. First stage regressions for the model estimated in column (1) of Table 3. Dependent
variables are indicators for the household receiving at least one cash transfer (columns 1, 3 and 5) or at least one in-kind transfer
(columns 2, 4 and 6). Instruments are indicators equal to 1 if the household lives in a village which was randomly assigned to
receive transfers in-cash or in-kind. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the village level.
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Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes children aged 15-16 at baseline. First stage regressions for
the model estimated in columns (1)-(3) of Table 5. Dependent variables are indicators for the household receiving at least one
cash transfer (columns 1, 3 and 5) or at least one in-kind transfer (columns 2, 4 and 6). Instruments are indicators equal to
1 if the household lives in a village which was randomly assigned to receive transfers in-cash or in-kind. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are clustered at the village level.
Bottom tertile Middle tertile Top tertile
Received
Cash
Received
Kind
Received
Cash
Received
Kind
Received
Cash
Received
Kind
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrument: Cash Village×Post 0.907*** -0.026* 0.939*** -0.022 0.912*** 0.006
(0.040) (0.016) (0.037) (0.015) (0.049) (0.007)
Instrument: Kind Village×Post 0.005 0.864*** 0.002 0.888*** 0.000 0.983***
(0.006) (0.040) (0.003) (0.032) (0.009) (0.010)
Post -0.036 0.064 -0.014 0.007 -0.006 0.026
(0.032) (0.040) (0.016) (0.042) (0.029) (0.038)
Income Index 0.008 -0.017* 0.003 0.025 0.011 -0.004
(0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.016) (0.011) (0.005)
Age 0.010 -0.029 0.007 0.006 0.012 -0.019
(0.011) (0.021) (0.010) (0.023) (0.015) (0.022)
Number of household members 0.020 -0.016 -0.000 0.014 -0.024 0.000
(0.017) (0.018) (0.004) (0.020) (0.025) (0.004)
Number of 0-5 children -0.025 0.002 -0.009 0.011 0.084* -0.014
(0.024) (0.024) (0.008) (0.033) (0.050) (0.010)
Number of 6-11 children -0.018 0.001 -0.010 -0.019 0.061 -0.003
(0.018) (0.023) (0.008) (0.030) (0.056) (0.007)
Number of 12-17 children -0.004 -0.027 0.007 0.021 0.007 -0.001
(0.007) (0.023) (0.011) (0.023) (0.014) (0.004)
Old member in the household 0.028 0.038 0.014 0.038 -0.053 0.003
(0.030) (0.030) (0.012) (0.130) (0.076) (0.012)
Head female 0.040 0.007 0.001 -0.080 -0.017 0.038
(0.032) (0.031) (0.009) (0.080) (0.019) (0.035)
Received Oportunidades 0.017 -0.063 -0.002 -0.043 -0.162 -0.087
(0.020) (0.045) (0.008) (0.065) (0.121) (0.080)
Received Liconsa 0.004 0.084** -0.002 -0.088 -0.065 0.124*
(0.010) (0.033) (0.007) (0.064) (0.041) (0.073)
Received other welfare program 0.002 0.038 0.011 0.018 -0.020 0.001
(0.013) (0.023) (0.010) (0.022) (0.013) (0.008)
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 254.8 230.6 429.1
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 347.5 453.5 241.4
Joint F statistic for the instruments 308.9 293.3 322.9 610.6 170.9 4668.6
Observations 528 528 528 528 514 514
Table C2: First stage regressions by household income tertiles
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Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes children aged 12-14 at baseline. The dependent
variable in columns 1 is an indicator for the child working in any activity (paid or unpaid) in the last seven days. The
dependent variable in columns 2 (3) is an indicator for the child working in a paid (unpaid) activity in the last seven
days. The dependent variable in column 4 is the number of working hours in the last seven days. Hours of work
are equal to zero for children not working in the last seven days. The dependent variable in column 5 is an indicator
for the child currently attending school. Cash×Post denotes an indicator for receiving the cash treatment in the post-
intervention survey; Kind×Post denotes an indicator for receiving the in-kind treatment in the post-intervention survey;
(Cash×Post)×Male interacts Cash×Post with an indicator for the child being male; (Kind×Post)×Male interacts
Kind×Post with an indicator for the child being male. Child controls, household controls and individual fixed effecs
are included. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are reported in parenthesis.
Empirical results for 12-14 years old children
Table C3 is analogous to Table 4 in the paper and reports the estimated impact of the program on
12-14 years old children’s time allocation by gender of the child. Table C4 is analogous to Table
5 in the paper and reports the estimated impact of the program on work participation and weekly
working hours by tertiles of the household income distribution for 12-14 years old children. Table
C5 is analogous to Table 6 in the paper and reports the estimated impact of the program on school
attendance by income tertiles for 12-14 years old children. Table C6 is analogous to Table 9 in the
paper and reports the estimated impact of the program on work participation and hours of work of
12-14 years old children for agricultural versus non-agricultural households.
Any work Paid work
Unpaid
work
Hours of
work
School at-
tendance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cash×Post 0.102** 0.063 0.021 0.842 0.014
(0.050) (0.038) (0.042) (1.777) (0.068)
Kind×Post 0.002 0.021 -0.033 -0.639 0.047
(0.039) (0.029) (0.026) (1.432) (0.055)
(Cash×Post)×Male -0.133* -0.096 0.004 2.475 -0.080
(0.080) (0.063) (0.048) (3.048) (0.064)
(Kind×Post)×Male -0.035 -0.037 0.039 1.026 -0.048
(0.065) (0.051) (0.039) (2.294) (0.051)
Mean in control group at follow-up 0.294 0.203 0.088 8.601 0.688
H0: Cash×Post=Kind×Post, p-value 0.023 0.269 0.132 0.314 0.556
H0: (Cash×Post)×Male=(Kind×Post)×Male,
p-value
0.206 0.286 0.473 0.615 0.598
Observations 3448 3410 3410 3402 3448
Table C3: Estimated impact of PAL on child labor and schooling by gender, 12-14 years old
children at baseline
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Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes children aged 12-14 at baseline. The dependent
variable in columns 1 to 3 is an indicator for the child working in the last seven days. The dependent variable in
columns 4 to 6 is the number of working hours in the last seven days. Hours of work are equal to zero for children
not working in the last seven days. Cash×Post denotes an indicator for receiving the cash treatment in the post-
intervention survey; Kind×Post denotes an indicator for receiving the in-kind treatment in the post-intervention survey.
Child controls, household controls and individual fixed effecs are included. "Bottom", "middle" and "top" refer to the
tertiles of the baseline income distribution as proxied by the income index discussed in Section 3.3. Standard errors
are clustered at the village level and are reported in parenthesis.
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes children aged 12-14 at baseline. The dependent
variable is an indicator for the child currently attending school. Cash×Post denotes an indicator for receiving the
cash treatment in the post-intervention survey; Kind×Post denotes an indicator for receiving the in-kind treatment in
the post-intervention survey. Child controls, household controls and individual fixed effecs are included. "Bottom",
"middle" and "top" refer to the tertiles of the baseline income distribution as proxied by the income index discussed in
Section 3.3. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are reported in parenthesis.
School attendance
Bottom tertile Middle tertile Top tertile
(1) (2) (3)
Cash×Post -0.152* 0.059 -0.061
(0.080) (0.075) (0.058)
Kind×Post 0.003 0.075 -0.032
(0.057) (0.065) (0.044)
Mean in control group at follow-up 0.571 0.662 0.867
H0: Cash×Post≥0, p-value 0.970 0.216 0.855
H0: Kind×Post≥0, p-value 0.477 0.123 0.767
H0: Cash×Post=Kind×Post, p-value 0.037 0.754 0.570
Observations 1184 1156 1108
Table C5: Estimated impact of PAL on school attendance by household income, 12-14 years old
children at baseline
Any work Hours of work
Bottom
tertile
Middle
tertile
Top tertile
Bottom
tertile
Middle
tertile
Top tertile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash×Post 0.080 -0.038 0.054 5.340 1.467 1.018
(0.075) (0.084) (0.074) (4.619) (2.412) (1.976)
Kind×Post -0.003 -0.109 0.045 -1.155 -2.143 3.002*
(0.053) (0.068) (0.063) (2.215) (2.158) (1.723)
Mean in control group at follow-up 0.347 0.353 0.158 11.440 10.073 3.375
H0: Cash×Post≤0, p-value 0.859 0.323 0.768 0.876 0.728 0.697
H0: Kind×Post≤0, p-value 0.481 0.056 0.764 0.301 0.160 0.959
H0: Cash×Post=Kind×Post,
p-value
0.234 0.282 0.852 0.125 0.051 0.220
Observations 1186 1158 1104 1160 1144 1098
Table C4: Estimated impact of PAL on child labor supply by household income 12-14 years old
children at baseline
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Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes children aged 12-14 at baseline. The dependent
variable in columns 1 is an indicator for the child working in the week prior to the survey. The dependent variable in
columns 2 is the number of working hours in the last seven days. Hours of work are equal to zero for children not work-
ing in the last seven days. The dependent variable in column 3 is an indicator for the child currently attending school.
Cash×Post denotes an indicator for receiving the cash treatment in the post-intervention survey; Kind×Post denotes an
indicator for receiving the in-kind treatment in the post-intervention survey; (Cash×Post)×Agric interacts Cash×Post
with an indicator for the household working in agricultural activities; (Kind×Post)×Agric interacts Kind×Post with
an indicator for the household working in agricultural activities. Child controls, household controls and individual
fixed effecs are included. Standard errors are clustered at the village level and are reported in parenthesis.
Appendix D: Additional robustness checks
Table D1 investigates the robustness of the results in Table 5 to correction for multiple hypothesis
testing, using the procedure described by Romano and Wolf (2005, 2016). Since the results in Table
5 consider multiple outcomes (work participation and hours of work) and multiple treatments (cash
versus in-kind), a total of twelve null hypothesis have been tested. In Table D1, I report the point
estimates and standard errors from Table 5, as well as the unadjusted and adjusted p-values (within
the curly brackets). As can be seen, the estimated coefficients for “Middle” and “Bottom” income
households are still significant even after correcting the p-values for multiple hypothesis testing.
Next, I check for potential censoring bias in the estimating equation for hours of work. In the
empirical analysis discussed in the paper, working hours have been coded as zero if the child was
not working. It is well known that estimation of models with censored dependent variables using
linear techniques might lead to estimation bias. In order to control for this issue, I use the Tobit
model with fixed effects in panel data developed by Honoré (1992). In other words, I estimate the
following equation
H∗i jt = ζ +ηPostt +β
CashZCashj ×Postt +βKindZKindj ×Postt +μ ′Xit +πi+ εi jt , (D1)
Any work Hours of work
School
attendance
(1) (2) (3)
Cash×Post 0.110 5.701 -0.146*
(0.094) (3.768) (0.083)
Kind×Post -0.057 -1.020 0.007
(0.060) (1.987) (0.051)
(Cash×Post)×Agric -0.111 -4.450 0.143
(0.108) (4.267) (0.088)
(Kind×Post)×Agric 0.036 0.808 0.021
(0.078) (2.619) (0.057)
Mean in control group at follow-up 0.294 8.601 0.688
H0: Cash×Post=Kind×Post, p-value 0.035 0.060 0.054
H0: (Cash×Post)×Agric=(Kind×Post)×Agric
p-value
0.091 0.167 0.133
Observations 3446 3400 3446
Table C6: Estimated impact of PAL on child labor and schooling by baseline sector of activity of
the household, 12-14 years old children
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where H∗i jt is the latent variable for the number of working hours for child i in village j at
time t; Postt is an indicator for the follow-up survey; ZCashj and Z
Kind
j are dummy variables taking
the value one if the child lives in a village receiving cash or in-kind transfers; Xit is a vector
of individual and household specific controls; πi represents individual fixed effects. Given that
observations are censored, we observe {(Hi jt ,ZCashj ,ZKindj ,Xit) : t = 1,2; i = 1, ...,N; j = 1, ...,J}
where Hi jt = max{H∗i jt ,0}. This specification is similar to the one in equation (12) but with one
difference. Since the properties of Honoré (1992)’s estimator with endogenous regressors have not
been studied, I replace the variables for household participation in the program, Cashi and Kindi,
with the village-level treatment dummies previously used as instruments. Table D2 shows that the
estimated treatment coefficients for households in the middle of the income distribution, and for
cash recipients in the bottom of the income distribution, are still strongly significant even after
controlling for censoring.
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Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes children aged 15-16 at baseline. The dependent variable in columns 1 to 3 is an indicator for the
child working in the last seven days. The dependent variable in columns 4 to 6 is the number of working hours in the last seven days. Hours of work are equal to
zero for children not working in the last seven days. Cash×Post denotes an indicator for receiving the cash treatment in the post-intervention survey; Kind×Post
denotes an indicator for receiving the in-kind treatment in the post-intervention survey. Child controls, household controls and individual fixed effecs are included.
"Bottom", "middle" and "top" refer to the tertiles of the baseline income distribution as proxied by the income index discussed in Section 3.3. Standard errors are
clustered at the village level and are reported in parenthesis. Curly brackets report on the left unadjasted p-values; and on the right p-values corrected for multiple
hypothesis testing as described in Romano and Wolf (2005, 2016).
Table D1: Estimated impact of PAL on child labor supply by household income, p-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing
Any work Hours of work
Bottom tertile Middle tertile Top tertile Bottom tertile Middle tertile Top tertile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cash×Post -0.014 -0.233** -0.059 -12.370** -14.064** -5.209
(0.099) (0.105) (0.108) (5.277) (4.353) (6.148)
{Unadjusted p-value; adjusted p-value} {0.889; 0.983} {0.026; 0.074} {0.583; 0.911} {0.019; 0.059} {0.001; 0.005} {0.397; 0.794}
Kind×Post 0.117 -0.218** 0.010 3.666 -8.212** -1.388
(0.099) (0.093) (0.070) (4.767) (4.148) (5.025)
{Unadjusted p-value; adjusted p-value} {0.236; 0.558} {0.019; 0.059} {0.887; 0.983} {0.442; 0.832} {0.048; 0.132} {0.782; 0.971}
H0: Cash×Post≤0, p value {0.444; 0.785} {0.013; 0.029} {0.292; 0.677} {0.010; 0.017} {0.001; 0.002} {0.198; 0.506}
H0: Kind×Post≤0, p value {0.882; 0.936} {0.009; 0.017} {0.556; 0.879} {0.779; 0.911} {0.024; 0.063} {0.391; 0.769}
Observations 528 528 514 498 518 498
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Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. The sample includes children aged 15-16 at baseline. The dependent
variable is the number of working hours in the last seven days. Hours of work are equal to zero for children not
working in the last seven days. Cash Village×Post is the interaction between a dummy for the household living in a
village in the cash treatment arm and a dummy for the post-intervention period; Kind Village×Post is the interaction
between a dummy for the household living in a village in the in-kind treatment arm and a dummy for the post-
intervention period. Child controls, household controls and individual fixed effecs are included. "Bottom", "middle"
and "top" refer to the tertiles of the baseline income distribution as proxied by the income index discussed in Section
3.3.
Table D2: Estimated impact of PAL on hours of work by household income, selection model
Hours of work
Bottom tertile Middle tertile Top tertile
(1) (2) (3)
Cash Village×Post -21.921** -30.559** -15.736
(11.010) (12.173) (20.917)
Kind Village×Post 3.843 -21.164* 3.645
(8.404) (12.218) (22.651)
H0: Cash Village×Post≤0, p-value 0.023 0.006 0.226
H0: Kind Village×Post≤0, p-value 0.676 0.042 0.564
H0: Cash Village×Post=Kind Village×Post,
p-value
0.003 0.307 0.129
Observations 514 530 517
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